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Editor: Nicholas Busch, Blomstervägen 7, S-791 33 Falun, Sweden
tel/fax: +46/23 26777, Email: nbusch@nn.apc.org

'Fortress Europe?'- Circular Letter is the organ of **Platform 'Fortress Europe?'** and of the **GENEVA GROUP - Violence and Asylum in Europe**. The 'Platform' is an informal international network concerned with European harmonisation in the fields of internal security, policing, justice, data protection, immigration and asylum and its effects on fundamental rights and liberties. It is associated with the European Civic Forum. The **GENEVA GROUP - Violence and Asylum in Europe** came into being in 1993 at a conference organised by the University of Geneva. The Group wishes to contribute to international multidisciplinary discussion on the right to asylum and its interaction with other developments in society. The objective of the Circular Letter is to offer a forum for mutual information, analysis and critical debate among experts and laypeople, scholars and practitioners. The Circular Letter is published 10 times a year. It offers a selection of news, comment and messages based essentially on the contributions of its readers.

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SCHENGEN

ONE YEAR OF SCHENGEN IN OPERATION

On 26 March 1995, the Schengen Implementing Convention (SIC) entered into force in seven member states (Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Spain and Portugal). According to both the Schengen "Central Group" of senior officials and the German Interior Ministry, the results of one year of implementation are satisfactory, despite shortcomings in various areas. More than ever, the Schengen co-operation is presented as an engine of the European Union. The question is, how long it will remain outside the EU framework.

Internal borders

The checks at internal Schengen border crossing points (i.e. crossing points between two Schengen-member states) have been abolished, except for French controls at that country's borders with the Benelux countries.

On the other hand, the Schengen states agreed on 24 October 1995 that the protection of the internal borders should be considered a matter of "common interest" and that the abolition of checks at crossing points should be compensated for by further improved cooperation between the police, the Customs and the judiciary, as well as by joint mobile controls in areas 20 km deep on both sides of internal borders.

The Permanent Conference of German Interior Ministers describes common border zones as "sensitive crimino-geographical areas" requiring continually improved transborder police cooperation.

For this purpose, joint bi-national police offices have been set up at the French-German and the French-Spanish borders. Similar agreements are planned between Germany and the Benelux countries. Germany regards this form of joint transborder policing as "a model for a particularly intense form of European police cooperation" and even considers concluding similar bi-lateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic, i.e. countries neighbouring the Schengen territory.

In its annual report on the implementation of the SIC, the Schengen Central Group notes that all member states are already "more or less systematically" carrying out mobile controls in areas close to internal borders to control the movement of third country nationals.

Cross-border observation and hot pursuit

The SIC provides for the police of one member state to cross the border of a neighbouring member state for observing or hunting criminals. However, the details of such cross-border police operations are defined in bi-lateral agreements between neighbour states. Germany has granted all its neighbouring Schengen member states a right of hot pursuit without time or territorial restrictions, while the German police are subject to varying restrictions in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Germany is now pressing for a harmonisation of the bilateral agreements to allow unrestricted observation and hot pursuit.

For the time being, cross-border hot pursuits and observations do not appear to occur very frequently. Germany, for example, reports only 51 cases of observation and 27 of hot pursuit from or to Germany, in the first 12 months of implementation of the SIC.

External borders

Intensified control measures at the external borders under the SIC, such as the requirement to check every third country (non-EU) national entering the Schengen territory against the computerised Schengen Information System (SIS), have sometimes led to delays at crossing-points and increased working pressure for border personnel. Two-track systems enabling a separate processing of "difficult or dubious cases", as well as border control posts lying side by side and permitting close cooperation with the neighbouring third country, help speed up controls, the Central Group says.

Surveillance is being steadily increased at the "green borders" outside official crossing points. Nonetheless, the Central Group reports constant illegal entry from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and South America, particularly at the German borders with Poland and the Czech Republic, but also at the French-Italian and French-Swiss borders (which became external Schengen borders in March 1995).

Innenpolitik, a monthly magazine published by the German Interior Ministry, particularly mentions the Mediterranean port of Bar in Montenegro as an example for a "localised and geographically restricted source of danger". According to *Innenpolitik*, thousands of undesirable third country nationals - most of them Kosovo-Albanians and Turks take the ferry from Bar to the Italian port of Bari and then make their way to Germany and the Benelux countries via France.

Innenpolitik stresses that, with regard to external border security, the extension of Schengen cooperation to the Nordic countries will result in "the line of protection and defence being further advanced".

As the next step, Germany wishes to facilitate full Swiss participation in Schengen cooperation. For the time being, the Schengen states should seek bilateral

agreements "made up of elements corresponding to the Schengen Agreement" with the Central and Eastern European states and Switzerland. The German objective is to "get these states to progressively bring their security and immigration policies closer to Schengen standards".

Border controls moved to the countries of departure

With a view to the effective prevention of illegal immigration, pre-boarding checks at airports of departure outside the Schengen territory or joint controls at Schengen airports of destination are increasingly carried out on so-called "risk flights". According to the Central Group, the implementation of the SIC has led to increased checks on third country nationals - mainly transiting passengers, who were usually not controlled earlier. This has resulted in a "significant rise" in denied entries.

A general trend towards moving entry controls to countries of departure is highlighted by *Innenpolitik*. The magazine describes the Schengen member states' foreign representations as "advanced security posts" and stresses the need for close cooperation of embassies and consulates in processing visa applications. The integration of the automatised VISION-system for mutual consultation on visa applications is to be integrated into the SIS through the setting up of SIRENE II, the second phase of the electronic communication system for Supplementary Information Requests at National Entries.

The introduction of a common Schengen visa allowing its bearer to travel to all Schengen member states, has led to visa applicants filing their application at the consulate of the Schengen member state which suits them best with regard to accessibility, visa fees and liberal reputation. Since the beginning of the implementation of the SIC, the total number of visa applications has significantly dropped by 17 per cent, from 4,893,119 (1994) to 4,083,540 (1995). But the drop in applications varies strongly from one member state to another. Thus, the decrease was -34 per cent for Belgium but only -8 per cent for the Netherlands.

Innenpolitik also advocates a systematic enforcement of so-called "carrier sanctions" as provided for by the SIC. Carrier companies must be required to carry out their own pre-flight checks on passengers at airports of departure and should be fined whenever they transport insufficiently documented passengers. The article claims that, while carrier companies are usually made liable for the costs of the return of passengers denied entry, a number of Schengen member states have failed, as yet, to systematically enforce additional sanctions under the SIC.

On 22 December, the Schengen Executive Committee (the Schengen Council of Ministers) agreed on the need for "pre-flight inspections" to be carried out by officers of the Schengen state of destination stationed at non-Schengen airports, and eventually at railway stations and sea ports of departure. The problem in realising this scheme lies with the third countries on whose territory the advanced border controls of the Schengen countries shall take place. According to *Innenpolitik*, many third country governments are opposed to foreign border control personnel operating on their territory.

SIS: A new quality of search

In its annual report, the Schengen Central Group describes the SIS as the only criminal search system of its sort in Europe. Unlike Interpol, search requests of member states are immediately stored in the SIS and communicated to the national parties of the SIS, the N-SIS. According to *Innenpolitik*, a "new quality of search" has been achieved compared with Interpol, since the member states are liable under the SIC to enter all relevant information into the SIS. A search request in the SIS automatically comprises a request for preliminary detention in view of extradition. Thus, the lawfulness of an extradition is already established from the moment the search request is entered into the SIS.

Innenpolitik further notes that, unlike the SIS, Europol has not been conceived as a criminal search system, but merely to enable the exchange of case-related information and analysis of trans-border criminality.

For these reasons, for the Schengen member states, "the SIS prevails over all other means of information", but this "of course does not mean that Interpol is no longer important". Interpol continues to be necessary for searches in neighbour states of the Schengen territory and in the rest of the world.

The Schengen states are currently drawing up rules defining the relation between the SIS and Interpol and particularly the necessary system interfaces.

3.8 million search requests in the SIS

According to the statistic tables attached to the annual report of the Central Group, in early March 1996 the number of valid search requests stored in the SIS amounted to 3,868,529.

939,758 of these requests concerned persons wanted on various grounds, including 507,859 persons denied entry to the Schengen territory (mostly rejected asylum seekers). Requests for "discreet surveillance" or "specific checks" under Article 99 number 8,254; 7,722 of these came from France alone. However no requests have as yet been entered under the controversial Article 99.3 of the SIC, which allows for observation and checks of persons not suspected of any specific crime on state security and public order grounds.

Other categories of data concern:

ID-documents:	1,407,450
Motor vehicles:	875,140
Bank notes:	499,641
Firearms:	111,205
Blank documents:	35,335

SIS, 2.4 million were entered by Germany, and 1.25 million by France. Of the total of 3.8 million items of data in the

"internal" hits (hits inside a member state due to an entry by another member state) and 12,574 "external" hits (hits outside the member state which entered the request). Registration in the SIS resulted in 19,011

The final storage capacity of the SIS in its present shape is 9 million items of data, according to the German Interior Ministry.

The integration of the Italian and the Greek N-SIS is currently being prepared and test programmes are run, although both countries have not ratified the Convention as yet.

According to *Innenpolitik*, the Schengen states have offered Britain and Ireland the use of the SIS, without requiring them to join the Schengen Convention first.

Judicial cooperation

The SIC contains a number of provisions on improved judicial cooperation, such as the possibility for the judiciary in one member state to send court documents to the addressee in another member state directly, instead of requesting judicial assistance from the member state concerned. The judiciary of one member state can also send requests for judicial assistance directly to the judicial authorities in another member state, without involving the Ministries of Justice.

According to the Central Group, cooperation is still hampered by problems. It is currently being examined how far a network of prosecutors specialised in judicial assistance could improve cooperation. Moreover, an agreement on judicial assistance on road traffic offences and the execution of sentences is being considered.

The relationship of Schengen with the EU

In view of the European Union's Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the question of the relationship between the Schengen framework and the EU is once again being discussed.

A Briefing on the Intergovernmental Conference and the Schengen Convention presented by the Working Party Secretariat of the European Parliament's "Task-Force" on the IGC, stresses that the SIC is "the precursor of or a sort of testing ground for the creation of a European area without frontiers where people can move freely", provided for in the EEC Treaty, the Single Act, and the TEU (Maastricht Treaty). It insists that the SIC "can and must be replaced by Community regulations valid for the whole Union". The Briefing further notes that, while the Schengen Convention does not formally appear on the IGC agenda, it will probably play an important indirect role in the improvements in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation, an important item on the conference agenda.

It further says that "Schengen and Union policy share a continuity and a common logic, especially as Article 142 of the Convention [SIC] requires the text to be adapted to changes in Community law intended to create an area without internal frontiers".

Two future options for the Convention are described:

- the "minimum option": coexistence between the two systems if some of the EU member states decide not to accede to the Schengen Convention. In that case the Schengen provisions would be adapted or replaced under Article 142 in accordance with changes in Union rules covering the same ground (e.g. the SIC chapter on firearms has already been replaced by a Union directive and the provisions on asylum will shortly be replaced by the Dublin Convention);

- the "maximum option": the Union would accept Schengen, which would be merged into the rules and structures provided for in the TEU.

In the latter event, the SIC could be "discarded, having acted as a catalyst and a testing ground for a European area without frontiers", the Briefing says.

While Germany was earlier believed to favour a rapid merger of Schengen with the EU, the State Secretary at the Interior Ministry, Kurt Schelker, stated in March such considerations are "premature at the moment". Germany argues that Schengen was conceived as an engine for EU development and has proved successful in the respect. Before moving the Schengen *acquis* to the First or Third Pillar of the TEU, one should await the outcome of the IGC. Germany fears an integration at the present moment could stall the dynamic Schengen cooperation while not bringing cooperation within the EU any further. According to Mr Schelker, a majority of member states shared this German view at an extraordinary meeting of the Schengen Executive Committee on 25 March, while Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg rather believe that an integration of Schengen would improve EU cooperation. The Dutch Schengen Presidency announced its intention to draw up a framework together with the EU Commission for proceedings after the IGC. At the IGC, The Italian EU Presidency is expected to present a proposal for a "Schengen Protocol" that could be attached to the TEU.

On its part, the European Commission says in a statement of 28 February that all items under the Third Pillar of the TEU, except criminal law and police cooperation, should be transferred to the First Pillar (i.e. Community law). "Such a transfer is particularly necessary in areas directly relevant to the free movement of persons, e.g. rules pertaining to crossing external borders, the fight against narcotics, immigration policies, policies regarding third country nationals, as well as asylum policies", the statement says and concludes: "In continuation of this line of thought it appears natural to integrate the Schengen Convention's provisions in the Treaty [on

European Union]".

Sources: Schengen Central Group: Jahresbericht über die Anwendung des Durchführungsübereinkommens im Zeitraum vom 26. März 1995 - 25. März 1996 (Annual Report on the implementation of the SIC), Brussels, 26.3.96, SCH/C (96) 17 rev; Innenpolitik (German Interior Ministry), March 1996; Report of an Ad hoc working group to the Permanent Conference of German Interior Ministers (Federal and Länder) on the implementation of the SIC, 14.12.9, in German; Note of State Secretary Kurt Schelter, Interior Ministry, to the Internal Affairs Committee of the German Parliament, Bonn, 29.4.96; Briefing on the IGC and the Schengen Convention, Luxembourg, 30.1.96, European Parliament, PE 165.808; Statement of the European Commission on strengthening and widening the political Union (Den politiske union må styrkes og udvidelsen forberedes), Brussels, 28.2.96, in Danish.

NORWAY AND SCHENGEN: LOVE IT OR LEAVE IT

Since 1 May, the five Nordic countries applying for membership of the Schengen group are participating in the work of all Schengen bodies as observers. At its meeting in The Hague on 18 April, the Schengen Executive Committee (Committee of Ministers) adopted guidelines for the cooperation agreements with the two non-EU candidate countries, Norway and Iceland. According to the guidelines, the two countries have only one option, if they fail to approve decisions taken by the Executive Committee: leave the Schengen group.

The guidelines with regard to the institutional framework for the cooperation agreements between the Schengen states and Norway and Iceland were drawn up by the Schengen Central Group (Committee of senior officials of the member states) and consist of five points:

1. Norway and Iceland will participate in all meetings of the various Schengen bodies. In all these meetings, the delegates of the two countries may state their views and particular interests, but have no right to vote.
2. Norway and Iceland decide freely on whether they want to approve decisions of the Schengen Executive Committee. When they approve decisions, the latter must also be applied by the two states.
 - 2a. Decisions accepted by Norway and Iceland create legal rights and obligations between them and the Schengen states.
3. Whenever the Executive Committee is to take a decision that Norway or Iceland might oppose, the Executive Committee shall take into account the two countries' positions before deciding.
4. Whenever new EU regulations replace provisions in the SIC binding Norway and Iceland, the two countries shall inform the Executive Committee on whether they will apply the new regulations.
5. If Norway or Iceland do not accept a decision of the Executive Committee or new EU-regulations, cooperation between the Schengen states and Norway and Iceland will cease pursuant to a procedure to be specified in the cooperation agreements.

In short, this means that Norway and Iceland will have no right to vote and that their refusal to accept just one decision of the Schengen states will result in their exclusion from Schengen cooperation as a whole. This should be compared against the right of every EU member state participating in Schengen to veto decisions of the Executive Committee.

Pressed by strong criticism at home against the planned cooperation agreement, the Norwegian Minister of Justice, Ms Grete Faremo, passionately defended the government's Schengen plans as a necessity in a speech to parliament on 24 April. Any other policy would result in the creation of strictly controlled external borders between Germany and Denmark, or between Norway and the other Nordic countries, Ms Faremo claimed, and she insisted that Norway will fully participate in preparing and drawing up Schengen decisions. In what seems to be an attempt to reassure the parliament, she further emphasised that the decisions of the Executive Committee have binding character only *for* the state, and not supra-national effect *in* the state. "The measures enter into force, when all parties of the Convention have notified that the necessary adoptions of national legislation have been made".

The Executive Committee must take all its decisions unanimously, the Minister said. Thus, according to Ms Faremo, The member states' positions "will essentially be settled through the discussions preceding a final decision".

Ms Faremo stressed that a situation, where Norway or Iceland could not approve a measure of the Executive Committee was "extremely unlikely" to arise. "It is inherent in the nature of consensual approach that the parties seek and find solutions with regard to which there is broad unity . . . I find it difficult to imagine a political situation where a decision that has been thoroughly prepared in bodies in which Norway participates, and that is acceptable to all Schengen states, including Denmark, Sweden and Finland, would not be acceptable to Norway".

Ms Faremo further emphasised that the three Nordic EU member states (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) are in any case bound by measures decided by the EU, such as for instance the list of countries whose nationals are subject to the visa obligation. Regardless of whether Norway joins Schengen or not, "it will prove difficult in practice to run a visa policy in the long term that differs significantly from what is valid for our Nordic neighbour countries".

Observer status

According to the SIC, observer status can be granted only to EU member states. One could have expected this to pose some problems with regard to the participation of Norway and Iceland in the meetings of the various Schengen bodies. However, the solution found shows that where there is a will, there is a way. Indeed, the Executive Committee decided in The Hague to grant "observer status" to Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, while it "invited" Norway and Iceland to participate in the Schengen bodies "as observers". According to the official press communique on the Executive Committee's meeting in The Hague, this formula implies "the unrestricted participation of all five Nordic states in the Schengen bodies".

Agenda for Nordic membership

The Nordic states and the Schengen group hope to conclude final negotiations before the end of 1996. As soon as the Convention is signed by Denmark, Finland and Sweden, Norway and Iceland are expected to sign their cooperation agreements. The agreements will then have to be ratified by the parliaments. The cooperation agreements with Norway and Iceland can enter into force only once parliaments in all five Nordic countries have ratified the texts.

Sources: Final Press Communique on the meeting of the Schengen Executive Committee in The Hague, 18.4.96 (in German); Address of Minister of Justice Grete Faremo to the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) on Norway's cooperation with the Schengen countries, 24.4.96 (in Norwegian); Schengen Central Group: Guidelines regarding the institutional framework for a cooperation agreement between the Schengen states and Norway and Iceland, Brussel, 21.3.96, SCH/C(96) 21 rev. (in Norwegian).

UNITED KINGDOM

"BACK ON THE TORTURE TRAIL"

Just over a year ago, reporter Martyn Gregory revealed British companies' involvement in international sales of electroshock equipments in *Dispatches*, a programme on the British TV Channel 4 (see CL No.31, p.4; No.36, p.7). "Back on the Torture Trail", a new programme by Gregory broadcast in March suggests that, a year later, the sales are going on as before.

Recent surveys of torture victims have confirmed electroshock as one of the most common methods of torture, and current examples of its use have been found in Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Lebanon, Syria, Zaire, and China, to name but a few.

Electroshock devices are prohibited weapons in the UK. Possession of them without a licence carries the same penalty as illegally holding an AK47 machine gun - a five year prison sentence.

According to the manufacturers, the new pulsed variants of electroshock weapons were developed in the 1980s on the basis of biomedical research. In 1990, an independent survey by the British Forensic Science Service (FSS), commissioned by the Home Office examined the possible hazardous effects of a range of different electroshock devices on the human body.

Repressive states like the weapon because it leaves very few marks and affords convenient push button torture which can be taught as a standard operating procedure to soften up and terrify detainees. The FSS study also reported that modern pulsed electroshock batons are more powerful than the old fashioned cattle prods by nearly two orders of magnitude.

Business as usual

Despite the furore which greeted the first exposure of the UK Torture Trail, on his second expedition "Back on the Torture Trail", Gregory found that of the eight British "internal security" companies he contacted, only two were unwilling to quote for a new order of 300 electroshock batons. It was very much business as usual. Compass Safety International, of Salisbury; SDMS of Chelsea; Civil defence Supplies (CDS) of Wellingore; J & S Franklin and CCS of London all volunteered a quote on the supply of electroshock devices to Channel 4's fake company, "E. Lopez Associates" of Basle. The most enthusiastic companies featured in Gregory's new programme were not put off by the fact that the intended destination was Zaire. None of the companies featured bothered to check out Lopez Associates' bona fides. In fact they were faxing their quotations to a public fax machine at a railway station in Switzerland.

Getting around restrictions

Some of the companies warned the undercover team that it was illegal to sell electroshock batons in Britain but said they could "tranship" the weapons so they would never have to touch British soil. These companies were well rehearsed in getting around current UK restrictions. For example *Dispatches* was told by David Knights, SDMS's chairman that they and their South African Associates, had previously sold electroshock products around the world to countries including Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mexico, Peru, Burma and Indonesia.

Another company offered to avoid export regulation, by selling the Dispatches undercover team 300 shock batons made by the Macoisa company of Mexico City at a cost of \$25,000. Macoisa's boss, Alfredo Aguilla, told Gregory's undercover team he could export the 40,000 volt batons on behalf of his British client anywhere they chose. Aguilla told Martyn Gregory that bad human rights records were no problem.

Company denials despite filmed evidence

When Martyn Gregory confronted the companies which had quoted Lopez Associates, they denied what TV spectators could see and hear and claimed that they never have supplied or will supply electroshock equipment.

Government denials

The British Government too has consistently denied any knowing collusion with this trade. After Gregory's revelations in his first *Dispatches* programme in 1995, the then President of the Board of Trade, Michael Heseltine, said that Gregory had effectively made the story up. Gregory promptly took Heseltine to the High Court where he won an apology and £55,000 in libel damages.

Eight months after the "Torture Trail" was first shown, the *Guardian* reported that an electroshock baton export licence had in fact been issued for transshipping some devices via the UK. Yet, on 29 February, the Secretary of State for the Home Department confirmed that "No company has been granted authority under this section specifically in respect of electroshock weapons in the last two years."

We can anticipate the Government denying any further involvement in this trade, yet one of the starkest revelations of "Back on the Torture Trail" is that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was helping to distribute advice on electroshock sales whilst Michael Heseltine's Department was assuring everyone that the trade did not exist. The Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers (APPSS) report published in 1994 and 75 per cent funded by the DTI, advises companies where to sell electroshock weapons in the Gulf region, where torture is widespread.

"An enormous cover up"

No prosecutions of companies named in the programmes have followed as yet the broadcasts of the "Torture Trail". Commenting on the affair, Ann Clywd, a Member of Parliament, said: "There's an enormous cover up going on and the government is deliberately dragging its feet. That is the conclusion I have come to after a year of asking questions."

Amnesty International is embarking on a worldwide campaign against the use of electroshock weapons. The Secretary General of Amnesty International, Pierre Sane, said: "It is not just good enough to prohibit the manufacturing of this equipment in the UK, or the sale or possession of this equipment in the UK. Legislation should also prohibit companies from engaging in offshore sale of this equipment."

Until then, effective control of this technology still relies on intrepid investigative journalism. In future, no dealer in electroshock equipment will be certain that his client is not working to expose him and this whole immoral business.

Robin Ballantyne

The author was consultant to Dispatches' "Back on the Torture Trail".

NEW POLICE POWERS FOR FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The British Government has rushed through new legislation on the fight against terrorism.

The "Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act" gives the police five substantial and unprecedented new powers.

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was introduced in 1974 as a temporary measure against IRA terrorism, but has been renewed each year, ever since.

The new police powers

Based on intelligence information indicating that terrorist activities must be expected in a particular area, police may cordon off an area for 28 days and declare it a "special zone". Within this zone, police are authorized to stop and body-search any passer-by, even in the absence of any suspicion of terrorism. Anybody refusing such an examination can be sentenced to 6 months imprisonment or a £5,000 fine. The police are authorized to decide alone the extent of the zone and the duration of the measure, but must report to the Home Affairs Department (Interior Ministry) within 48 hours.

The police are granted further far-reaching powers to search freight in ports and airports, as well as, for example, entire office buildings, to seal off quarters at risk and remove vehicles parked in front of sensitive premises.

The new legislation actually puts on a par Britain with Northern Ireland, where the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC: Ulster police force) was been granted these powers long ago.

The new law was not opposed by the opposition Labour Party and was rushed through in fast-track proceedings just before the Parliament's Easter recess without any informed debate.

The British magazine *Statewatch* writes that the new legislation is likely to further erode the civil liberties of the Irish community in Britain, that it further blurs the distinction between the ordinary criminal law powers and extraordinary powers for fighting terrorism, and - through the concept of "special zones" - shifts the focus of policing away from an individual to an area. Finally, *Statewatch* argues that the new powers are "a clear reflection of the failure of the existing legislation", since the PTA has not prevented terrorism. "Yet the police requested even more powers . . . and they have been granted with even less restrictions. Gone is the need for reasonable suspicion and gone too is the need for some independent check . . ."

"If a 'police state' is one in which the police define and implement the law without any checks and balances in the use of the law, then this legislation takes Britain closer to one", *Statewatch* concludes.

Sources: Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3.4.96; Statewatch vol 6 no 2, March-April 96.

NORWAY

JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO NORWEGIAN SECRET SURVEILLANCE

From the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the Norwegian State Security illegally registered and spied on citizens not suspected of any crime. The recent revelation of the gigantic surveillance operation has caused public alarm in a country proud of its democratic system of government.

On 1 February 1994, the Norwegian parliament appointed a commission, chaired by Supreme Court judge Ketil Lund, enquire into public allegations concerning illegal surveillance of Norwegian citizens. The background was years of allegations of illegal surveillance activities undertaken by the Norwegian surveillance police, responsible for internal security, as well as by the military intelligence agencies. The commission concluded its 1185 page report on 28 March.

While the report acquits the military of most allegations, the criticism of the Norwegian Surveillance Police is crushing. The report documents in detail a wide range of blatantly illegal and/or entirely unacceptable surveillance activities on the part of the Surveillance Police between the late 1940s and the late 1980s.

Police registered 11 year old "marxists"

Between the late 1940s and the late 1960s, Norwegian communists were exposed to extensive electronic bugging of rooms, which was and is illegal in Norway. They were also exposed to widespread illegal telephone tapping. Their headquarters and meetings were tapped, and a large number of individuals were registered.

During the 1970s and 1980s, a new Marxist-Leninist group, which founded the "Workers' Communist Party" in 1973, was exposed to similar surveillance activities including party headquarters, their summer camps, etc. In the summer camps, children as young as 11 were registered by the Police.

Informers were extensively and systematically used in schools to register pupils down to 9th grade. Also the Socialist People's Party was spied upon, just as a large number of non-governmental organisations with links to the parties in question.

Involvement of the Norwegian Labour Party

During a major part of the period, close contacts, cooperation and collusion existed between the Surveillance Police and the Norwegian Labour party. Central members of the Labour Party organised surveillance measures and large amounts of information were exchanged.

The Labour Party, it should be pointed out, has been in power in Norway during a large part of the period in question. There have also been triangular relationships between the Surveillance Police, the Labour Party and various industries (of no importance to Norway's defence), in order to avoid the employment of suspected communists.

The commission concludes that "the participation of the Surveillance Police in the extensive cooperation concerning exchange of information, to a considerable extent obtained by illegal bugging of rooms, is a serious case of illegal state administrative activity, altogether perhaps the most serious case ever revealed in this country".

Dubious role of the Courts

The report also deals with the role of the courts. In Norway, telephone tapping requires a court order. The courts are heavily criticised for their way of handling police requests for telephone tapping. In Oslo, for example, the judge, after receiving a request, simply walked over to the police headquarters and signed a pre-written document permitting telephone tapping. Permissions were routinely renewed without any scrutiny of the development of the investigation, new evidence, and so on. Other control mechanisms, such as the Control Commission, are also reprimanded. In numerous instances, individuals had their telephones tapped, and extensive surplus information about general organisational activities was stored. This is illegal in Norway.

Norwegian "Stasi scandal"?

After receiving the report, the parliament decided to make it public. The disclosure has caused great public alarm and debate. Leaders of almost all party groups have expressed strong disapproval of the large-scale snooping activities revealed by the report. Today's leaders of the Labour Party have joined in the general condemnation, but have attempted to condone or portray the illegal and unacceptable activities in the light of the "historical circumstances" and the Cold War, after World War II. The commission points out that this defence can hardly be mustered for the extensive surveillance in the 1960s, when the traditional communists had been reduced to an insignificant political group in Norway. Likewise, it has been pointed out that the Cold War can hardly be pressed into service as a defence in relation to the Marxist-Leninists in the 1970s and 1980s, who developed a strongly anti-Soviet standpoint. Finally, it has been emphasised that regardless of external threats, blatantly illegal catch-all surveillance is unacceptable.

Victims might be granted access to their files

The Labour Party Prime Minister, Ms Gro Harlem Brundtland, has refused to express her regrets on the part of the State to the victims of illegal surveillance, pending a reaction of Parliament. The leaders of all of the opposition parties, including the Conservatives, have criticised her stands.

The snooping activities of Norwegian security bodies are now being compared with the scandal of the Stasi files in the former German Democratic Republic, and the demand has been voiced that the large number of people who have been registered should be granted access to their personal files.

Parliament is currently examining the report with a view to decide on further action. The possibility of impeachment will no doubt be considered.

Thomas Mathiesen (Oslo)

ONE RECOGNISED REFUGEE IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1996

During the first four months of 1996, 1 (one) asylum seeker was granted refugee status in Norway. In addition, 425 were granted residence on humanitarian grounds. The number of applicants was 1114.

During all of 1995, the number of applicants who obtained refugee status was 29. 1,909 asylum seekers were granted residence on "humanitarian grounds". The total number of applications was 4,357.

Critics argue that the documentation required by the authorities is so extensive that hardly any asylum seeker is able to meet the requirements. They also stress that there is a major difference between refugee status and residence on humanitarian grounds, in that the latter status paves the way for right wingers to insinuate that Norway is taking in bogus refugees and thereby pursuing a "too liberal" immigration policy. Such accusations tend to lead to a more restrictive policy.

At present, about 70 refugees who have been denied asylum, most of them Kosovo-Albanians, have sought sanctuary in Norwegian churches, where the police according to tradition have no access. The Archbishop and many pastors and priests demanded amnesty for the refugees on 17 May, Norway's national holiday, but Prime Minister Brundtland quickly rejected the demand, arguing that an amnesty for this particular group of refugees would trigger constantly new demands of other groups.

The extremely restrictive Norwegian asylum policies have drawn international attention. The UNHCR has announced a review of the country's asylum practice.

Thomas Mathiesen

SWITZERLAND

SWISS-HUNGARIAN POLICE AND JUSTICE COOPERATION

On a visit to Budapest in mid-April, the Swiss Minister of Justice and Police, Arnold Koller, agreed with his Hungarian counterparts, Justice Minister Vastagh and Interior Minister Kuncze, upon the intensification of the two countries' cooperation in the fields of justice, police and internal security.

Switzerland will continue to assist Hungary in pursuing the reform of its judicial system. Switzerland has already trained some 250 Hungarian judges.

The talks also centred on an assessment of the situation with reference to internal security and international organised crime. The two countries intend to conclude a bilateral agreement enabling an effective fight against crime by the swift exchange of data and joint criminal investigations.

Intense police cooperation between Switzerland and Hungary has been going on for several years. Switzerland substantially assisted the reorganisation of Hungarian police.

The Hungarian Interior Minister has now asked Switzerland to continue its assistance programme, in particular with regard to the setting up of a criminal register and the development of electronic data systems for the police. Switzerland is to supply Hungary with an electronic fingerprint register.

Mr Koller and Interior Minister Kuncze also exchanged views with regard to migration problems and the return of the refugees from the former Yugoslavia.

Source: Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police: press release, 19.4.96.

FRANCE

NEW ANTI-IMMIGRATION PROPOSALS EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT

A parliamentary committee of inquiry is calling for new, radical measures against immigrants, and Interior Minister Jean-Louis Debré has presented a first proposal for a draft bill aiming at a further sharpening of the infamous "Pasqua laws" on immigration. A xenophobic extreme-right clique within the parliamentary majority is increasingly imposing its policies on the right-wing government of Prime Minister Juppé.

Half a year ago the Parliament set up a Committee of inquiry on illegal immigration. The objective of the Committee was to examine the reasons for the malfunction of existing legislation against illegal immigrants and to propose remedies.

The Committee is composed of 30 MPs. Among the MPs representing the governing majority are no fewer than six MPs known for their extreme-right and xenophobic stance. Opposition is represented by only three socialist and one communist MP.

The findings of the Committee were presented in a report in April.

Special visa and finger-print registering

The report introduces the discriminatory term "migration risk countries". To make things clear, the authors of the report expressly specify that "there is of course no question of penalizing the Americans or the Canadians".

In order to prevent nationals from "risk countries" destroying evidence proving their nationality and their identity, the report recommends that digitalized finger-prints be taken from all "risk country" nationals applying for a visa. For the same purpose, a threefold visa would be issued: the first copy would be kept by the issuing Consulate, the second would be sent to DICILEC (Border protection police), while the third would be put into the hands of the airplane-crew on the journey to France and passed on to the French police upon arrival.

It is noteworthy that the number of granted visas fell from 5.6 million in 1987 to 2.3 million in 1994.

"Host register"

Under the French Foreigners Law, visitors from countries subject to visa obligation must show an accommodation certificate proving that they will be the responsibility, during their stay, of a person with legal residence in France. The Committee of Inquiry is of the opinion that these accommodation certificates are a source of illegal immigration, with many visitors simply remaining in the country once their visa has expired. Consequently, the report recommends sweeping surveillance measures aimed not only at the foreign visitors but also at their French hosts. Thus, persons accommodating foreigners would be registered in a special national data register. The authorities would thereby be able to check whether a host has a sufficient income to stand guarantee for the foreign visitor and to hold hosts liable for foreigners who fail to leave the country. This means that, just as "carrier sanctions" aim against private airlines bringing unwanted foreigners into the country, "host sanctions" would aim against private individuals who fail to throw foreigners out of the country. However, Paul Lagarde, a professor of law at Paris-I University, says there is no legal basis for compelling hosts to take their foreign visitors back to the border.

Searches

The report recommends that not only Customs but also DISSELEC and the Gendarmerie be authorised to search motor vehicles in 20 km deep zones inside the French borders, as well as in port and airport areas.

Medical care

The Committee is of the opinion that medical aid is granted to illegal immigrants in a "too liberal manner" and recommends that it be limited to cases of emergency or risk of contagion only.

Children punished for old sins of their parents?

The report considers the abolition of the right for foreign children born in France to seek French citizenship, if their parents were in the country illegally at the time of their birth.

Prolonged detention of deportees

The period under which foreigners may be detained pending their deportation could be extended to 45 days, if the Committee has its way.

The Interior Minister's "preliminary" draft bill

Already in early March, before the publication of the parliamentary committee's report, Interior Minister Debré had prepared what he called a preliminary draft bill on immigration. Among other things, the bill provides for the detention without any time limit of foreigners who hide their ID documents, the seizure of passports of suspected immigrants, a finger-print register on illegals, a register of persons who accommodate foreigners, and a ban on disembarkation for clandestine passengers who wish to apply for asylum . . .

Scepticism within the Government

Both above initiatives are expected to result in one bill that could be presented to parliament before the summer vacations and voted in autumn.

However, French human rights organisations and distinguished legal experts have contended that a number of proposals both in the Interior Ministers draft bill and the report of the parliamentary committee breach the Constitution and are therefore likely to be annulled by the Constitutional Council, if passed by Parliament.

Even within the Government, the plans of the Interior Minister and the committee are being met with scepticism. Former Interior Minister Charles Pasqua said it would be better to actually enforce his restrictive foreigner law package of 1993 instead of amending foreigners law for the 14th time in 16 years. Pasqua's views are said to be shared by Prime Minister Juppé and Justice Minister Toubon. And the Paris daily *Libération* quotes a senior government official's comment on the parliamentary report: "This committee of inquiry was real bullshit, it should never have been set up. This inevitably meant handing over to the extremists. And here is the result".

Sources: *Libération*, 5.4.96, 16.4.96; *Le Monde*, 30.3.96, 17.4.96.

ITALY

FORMER HIGH-RANKING MAFIA HUNTER SENTENCED FOR MAFIA MEMBERSHIP

Bruno Contrada, a former high-ranking Italian Intelligence officer, has been sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in Palermo for membership of the mafia. The sentence came after a trial that lasted two years. The Court found it proven that the 67 year old defendant had supported the Cosa Nostra and enabled the escape of leading mafia bosses.

Before his arrest in 1992, Contrada was considered to be one of Italy's foremost mafia hunters. On his part, Contrada has constantly pleaded innocence and claimed that he was the victim of a plot.

Source: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 9.4.96.

OPINION

Nicholas Bell, the author of the following piece, is the editor of *AIM Review*, the English language publication of AIM (Alternativna Informativna Mreza). For three years, this alternative information network, made up of independent journalists throughout former Yugoslavia, has been providing an objective picture of developments in the region, often revealing realities rarely covered by the media in

the West.

Western European "host" countries seem determined to proceed with the return of refugees from the former Yugoslavia already this year. The following article, based on recent AIM-dispatches, is an alarming description of the situation awaiting returnees.

SIX MONTHS AFTER DAYTON

A tour round the three republics in former Yugoslavia whose presidents signed the Dayton Agreement demonstrates the extent to which the much heralded peace process has increased the international "legitimacy" of the regimes in place, enabling them to reinforce their authoritarian hold on power.

Croatia

Let us start with Croatia, a republic so long held up as a Catholic and western oriented partner. When the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (CoE) announced that the question of membership of Croatia would be included on the agenda of the April session of the Parliamentary Assembly (PA), it seemed as though it would at last be accepted into the "family of democratic nations". Having accepted Russia despite Chechnya, it was highly unlikely that the PA would refuse Croatia. And yet President Tudjman and his HDZ party immediately proceeded to do all they could to confirm the fears of those not yet convinced by Croatia's democracy and human rights record. They set about violating, in an even more arrogant and crude way than usual, many of the 21 conditions which Zagreb had accepted in order to gain membership of the CoE.

One of the key points is the election of the mayor of Zagreb. In the last municipal elections a coalition of opposition parties won over 60 per cent of the votes and yet Tudjman has refused to accept all of the four candidates put forward by the coalition. His appointee has refused to resign although the municipal assembly twice voted a motion of no-confidence in her, and the government annulled the budget adopted by the assembly. Tudjman is simply incapable of imagining that the capital city should not be ruled by the HDZ. The opposition has been accused in the main TV news programmes of treason and serving foreign interests. The President finally decided to solve this problem by annulling the elections and calling new ones in the autumn - only for this decision to be declared unconstitutional last week by the Constitutional Court.

Clamping down on the media

Zagreb has been particularly active in the media field, clamping down on independent voices which criticise the regime. When the only independent daily, *Novi list* in Rijeka, dared to denounce Tudjman's dictatorial behaviour it received the visit of the financial police, resulting in a totally fabricated accusation of tax evasion and a fine of 3.7 million DM, equivalent to almost the entire value of the newspaper. A purge has been carried out even in *Vjesnik*, a Zagreb daily much closer to the regime.

A recent reform of the Criminal Code has enabled the state prosecutor to take to court those who insult or defame the President, the Prime Minister or the Presidents of Parliament, the Constitutional and Supreme Courts. As the satirical weekly, *Feral Tribune* (FT) put it, "in contrast to England, instead of mad cows Croatia got five holy cows".

Tudjman is returning to the worst methods of the old regime to silence journalists. The first to suffer, within a few weeks of the new legal reform, was of course the FT which the President is determined to destroy. On 3 May, an Interior Ministry policeman arrived at the FT's office and demanded that its editor, Victor Ivancic, come in for questioning. Soon a second FT (and AIM) journalist, Marinko Culic, was also taken in for an "informative talk". They have been charged at the request of Tudjman and face a possible three years in prison.

What did they do to so upset the President? They simply dared to criticise his recent proposal to turn the Jasenovac concentration camp site, one of the worst centres of mass extermination of the 2nd World War, into a "memorial area for all victims of the war" by transferring the remains of Ustashe fascists killed by the partisans. The FT published an article, "Bones in a mixer", and a photo-montage showing a skeleton with a presidential ribbon entitled "Jasenovac, the largest Croatian underground city". If Tudjman goes ahead with his "spectacular mass migration of the dead", the well-known Zagreb Jewish intellectual, Slavko Goldstein, has announced that he will take him to court for necrophilia.

Ethnic totalitarianism

Another field in which a kind of ethnic totalitarianism can be seen is women's rights. A new "National Programme for Demographic Development" (NPDD) has been approved. It strongly reduces the right to abortion and calls on all public figures and media to promote the role of women as mothers of large Croat families. The Franciscan priest, Ante Bukovic, a former Secretary of State for Demographic Development and the driving force behind the NPDD, recently ranted at a public meeting at Zagreb city hall that "since the foundation of the state, 180,000 abortions have been carried out and Croatian doctors have therefore taken the lives of five or six times more small Croats than the Chetniks have". The NPDD also calls for a massive return of Croat emigrants in Canada,

Australia or the USA, but of course says nothing about facilitating the return of the Serbs expelled from the Krajina. It even creates a right to conscientious objection - for doctors not wishing to carry out abortions on moral grounds.

Campaign of hate against Muslims

This ultra-nationalism can also be seen in attitudes towards Bosnia-Herzegovina (B&H). The Herzegovina lobby, headed by the defence minister, Goyko Susak, refuses to accept the alliance with the Muslims and is determined to keep its "Herzeg Bosna" statelet. Recent events in Mostar are the best proof of this. Recently, much of the Croatian media has stepped up its campaign of hate against the Muslims accused of seeking a fundamentalist state and of wanting to exterminate the Croats. Many have compared the atmosphere to the one before the Croat-Muslim war in 1993 and wonder if certain circles are preparing the ground for a new conflict once the IFOR troops have left B&H.

To get back to Croatia and the CoE, despite the regime's arrogant methods, the PA indeed went ahead and gave the go-ahead for Croatian membership, causing many observers to fear for the CoE's continued attachment to its traditional role as a defender of human rights. Strangely, it is the Council of Ministers of the European Union which finally said that enough is enough and recommended that Croatia's membership of the CoE should be postponed to a later date - perhaps, some people think, simultaneously with B&H and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Serbia

President Milosevic may now be praised by the international community for his positive contribution to the peace process, but his central preoccupation remains as ever holding on to power. If this means abandoning his Greater Serbia policy, dropping his support for the Krajina Serbs or Radovan Karadzic and refusing to allow Serb refugees from Croatia and B&H to enter Serbia (refugees who earlier had been trumpeted as proof of Croat or Muslim aggression), then so be it. Nationalism had given him the key to power, but he was quite happy to adapt to circumstances if this would bring an end to sanctions.

Total control of the electronic media

As in Croatia, one of the main "battlegrounds" is the media. Like Tudjman's HDZ, the ruling SDS totally controls the main electronic media, above all state TV. Until recently, Belgrade had an independent station, *Studio B*, but this was taken over by the authorities early this year. The regime has also moved against the written press, taking over control of the independent newspapers, *Borba* and *Svetlost*, whose journalists refused to accept state control and have since launched new independent versions.

In April the public campaign against independent media was taken a step further when *Politika* and the main TV news published the list of media which had received funds from the EU, accusing their editors of driving Mercedes cars and living in expensive villas thanks to the money they had "earned" through their subversive activities against Serbia.

A few days later, the police arrived at the Albanian-language Kosovo newspaper, *Koha*, and ordered it to stop publication (this decision was later reversed - at least for the moment).

Once again, what most seemed to have annoyed the regime were photo-montages "which flagrantly offend President Milosevic". One showed him in the company of a young fascist and another an army in nazi uniforms marching in front of the suspended Assembly of Kosovo.

Mounting tension in Kosovo

Kosovo has recently witnessed a severe increase in tension. During the "black week" at the end of April an Albanian student was murdered in cold blood by a Serb, five Serbs (four of them policemen) were then killed in different parts of Kosovo and then an Albanian boy was killed in an explosion. Some observers believe that a well trained and equipped organisation of extremists was behind the violence - either Serbs determined to prevent any form of autonomy for the Albanians or Albanians who refuse to accept that Kosovo should remain within the FRY. What is certain is that after years of fierce police repression which has caused a climate of fear among the Albanian population, it is now the Serbs in Kosovo who are also afraid. Many are beginning to think of leaving, but worry that they will be treated no better than the Serb refugees from Krajina or Slavonia who have been so badly received in Serbia.

Absurd effects of the regime's obsession with power

The obsession with power often has absurd effects in the economic field. For example, in Voivodina, the bread basket of the whole of former Yugoslavia, only 43,000 hectares out of the planned 1.2 million hectares of cultivated land (3.6 per cent of the total) had been sown by the end of March. The optimal sowing time was coming to a close and only 6,000 ha out of 80,000 ha of vegetables had been sown or 10,000 ha out of the planned 64,600 ha of sugar beet.

Despite repeated promises, no money had been made available. The regime had preferred to use its budget to pay pensions because the elderly form a crucial part of the electorate.

The recent dismissal of the governor of the Central Bank, Dragoslav Abramovic, is also significant. He is famous for having overcome hyper-inflation two

years ago. Now he has fallen into disfavour because he refuses to accept that the regime simply prints money to counter a wave of social and economic unrest and because he sought an agreement with the IMF without insisting as a precondition that it recognises the FRY as the legal successor to the former Yugoslav federation. Many fear that his departure will cause a long delay in the re-establishment of FRY's international economic integration.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Bosnian Serb leadership is even more obsessed with its political agenda of nationalism and is willing to sacrifice all economic good sense to it. The recent dismissal by Karadzic of his Prime Minister, Rajko Kasagic, was the climax of a struggle between the pragmatists based in Banja Luka, the richest part of Republica Srpska (RS) with many private enterprises wanting to develop commerce, and the fanatics in Pale. The Dayton Agreement lays down that economic aid will only be provided if the two entities in B&H accept a unified financial structure, linked transport and electric power systems . . .

Such a cooperation with the "enemy" in the Federation is unacceptable for the hardliners. "We shall oppose such plans", says the Energy Minister, Milorad Skoko. "We shall not give in and will therefore have to rely on ourselves". A proposed agricultural seed program for both B&H entities has been cancelled for the RS because Pale refused to accept EU funding through a single Bosnian channel.

Kasagic was in favour of cooperation both with the Federation and the international community and was therefore seen as a traitor by the radicals, many of whom would seem to live in a world of demented illusions. One mad scheme, proposed by the same circles who prefer to lose all international aid for the sake of their nationalist obsession, is to build a series of new cities. "New Sarajevo" would have a population of 140,000 and its construction would swallow up the entire national product for 15 years . . .

Izetbegovic's strategy of ethnic domination

Meanwhile, Sarajevo itself has lost almost all of its Serbs because the leadership in Pale told them to leave. But it has also lost its Mayor. Izetbegovic's SDA party simply decided to dissolve the city and turn it into a canton with more districts. This is all part of a strategy aimed at ensuring ethnic domination and mono-ethnic authorities, a policy fully shared by the Croats in the HDZ who are in the process of buying as many of the houses abandoned by the Serbs as possible in order to create a Croat part of Sarajevo linked to the officially unrecognised but very much present "Herzeg Bosna".

Present situation suits the "local kings"

The economic development of the Federation will be made almost impossible if the ethnic argument wins the day. Christian Schwarz Schilling, a German CDU member of parliament who has been appointed a mediator by the Federation, almost despairs for the future: "I had the opportunity to see for myself the 'local kings' who are opposed to Dayton. The present situation suits them just fine - they maintain their power and make plenty of profits. The Federation must create a joint police force to ensure order and remove the illegal checkpoints in many places which charge thousands of DM for the transportation of goods from Croatia to cities of B&H". He is particularly critical of the Croat side, but "different fanaticisms advocate the same programmes and feed on each other".

Returnees are threatened

Schwarz Schilling, like many others, criticises the fact that almost no refugees have been able to return to a zone dominated by a different ethnic group, even in the Federation. "The Croats have problems returning to Muslim areas and the Muslims even greater problems. This is justified by the fact that many houses are occupied by one's 'own' refugees, but the fact is that the returnees are threatened".

Recently in Mostar an OSCE official succeeded in bringing 40 Croat families back to the Muslim part of the town and when he attempted to bring four Muslim families to the Croat zone, they were rounded up the day after and taken 80 km from the town and left in the middle of a minefield.

There would be much to say about developments in B&H, particularly with the prospect of forthcoming elections. But this will have to wait for another article. Let us conclude with one good piece of news after this bleak picture of the post-Dayton situation. Early in March, the Democratic Alternative met for the second time within B&H at Tuzla. The DA brings together civic movements, independent media and opposition parties from both parts of B&H. It had already met twice in Italy in 1995 and now this year has been able to bring together people from all over the republic (with the logistical support of the OSCE) who refuse ethnic division. They are convinced that the vast majority of the Bosnian population wants genuine peace and friendly relations.

The problem is that such an initiative has received almost no coverage or interest in the foreign media and has been generally ignored by the "international community" which ever since the beginning of the conflict has chosen to negotiate with the war-lords and not put its full backing behind the forces for peace and dialogue. The next meeting of the DA is planned for Banja Luka - if the authorities of Republica Srpska allow this. It should be a top international priority to ensure that this meeting can take place there, so that the Bosnian Serb population is able to hear another voice than that of Karadzic and consorts. The very fact that a network like AIM of journalists from all of the republics, regions and communities of former Yugoslavia has existed for three years is proof enough that there is a potential alternative to ethnic hatred and division.

Nicholas Bell

For more information contact: AIM, 13 rue Gazan, F-75014 Paris; Tel: +33/145898949, Fax: +33/1 45809940;
E-mail: i.bourboulon@paris.aim.zerberus.de

DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

Briefing on Europol, European Parliament, Task-Force on the Intergovernmental Conference, Luxembourg, 30.1.96, PE 165.807, 16 p., in English.

Temporary migration for employment purposes -Report and guidelines, Council of Europe, European Committee on Migration, Strasbourg 1996, CDMG(96) 18E.

Draft Resolution on individuals who cooperate with the judicial process in the fight against organised crime, EU-Council (K.4 Committee), Brussels, 29.2.96, 5440/96 LIMITE, JUSTPEN 30.

The Draft calls on the member states to adopt appropriate measures to encourage members of criminal associations to cooperate with the judiciary. Member states are, inter alia, encouraged to grant "benefits to individuals who break away from a criminal organisation and do their best to prevent the criminal activity being carried further."

The Dutch parliament unanimously obliged the government not to adopt the Draft, proposed by the Italian EU presidency, on the grounds that criminals should not be used as state witnesses and covert agents and should not be baited with large amounts of money, reduction of sentences and special measures for their protection.

EVENTS

Frontiers - the Challenge of Interculturality: International Conference, Belgrade, 30 May - 1 June 1996.

The objective of the conference is to discuss the possibility of conceiving the frontier - in contrast to the dominant political definition of the frontier as a limiting, preventing and prohibitive factor - as an area of mutual exchange of cultures, coexistence of various entities, understanding among members of various nations and confessions, as well as among people of various political beliefs. Reasons for opening public discussion of this issue in the Balkans today seem self-evident.

Contact: Dr Bozidar Jaksic, Tel/Fax +381/
11 646242; Narodnog fronta 45, 11000 Belgrade, FRY.

24th Annual Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance & Social Control, Bangor, North Wales, 12-15 September 1996:

Regulating Europe - Criminology, Care and Control

Contact: Chris Powell, Centre for Comparative Criminology & Criminal Justice, University of Wales, Bangor, North Wales, LL57 2DG, UK; Tel: +44/1248 382839, Fax: 362029; e-mail: c.powell@bangor.ac.uk

"Speak out for refugee rights!" - Conference in Brussels, 13-14 June 1996

Organised by UNITED for Intercultural Action with the support of the Green Group and the Socialist Group in the European Parliament.

Contact: UNITED, PB 413, NL 1000 AK Amsterdam; Tel: +31/20 6834778, Fax: 6834582; e-mail: united@antenna.nl

Contributors to CL No.43: Christian Busold (Bonn), Thomas Mathiesen (Oslo), Robin Ballantyne (Manchester), Mads Bruun Pedersen (Copenhagen), Catherine Weber (Berne), Jean-Pierre Alaux (Paris), Nicholas Bell (Forcalquier, F), Jolyon Jenkins (Brighton, UK), Nicholas Busch (Falun, S).

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Université de Genève, Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences de l'Education, Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp et

Axel Clévenot, 9 route de Drize, CH-1227 Carouge-Genève
Tel: +41/22 7057111 Fax: +41/22 3428924

FARR (Swedish Network for Asylum and Refugee Support Groups)
Box 137, S-776 23 Hedemora; Tel/Fax: +46/225 14777

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