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'Fortress Europe?'- Circular Letter is the organ of **Platform 'Fortress Europe?'** and of the **GENEVA GROUP - Violence and Asylum in Europe**. The 'Platform' is an informal international network concerned with European harmonisation in the fields of internal security, policing, justice, data protection, immigration and asylum and its effects on fundamental rights and liberties. It is associated with the European Civic Forum. The **GENEVA GROUP - Violence and Asylum in Europe** came into being in 1993 at a conference organised by the University of Geneva. The Group wishes to contribute to international multidisciplinary discussion on the right to asylum and its interaction with other developments in society. The objective of the Circular Letter is to offer a forum for mutual information, analysis and critical debate among experts and laypeople, scholars and practitioners. The Circular Letter is published 10 times a year. It offers a selection of news, comment and messages based essentially on the contributions of its readers.

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AUSTRIA

INTERIOR MINISTER SHUTS HIS EYES TO NEO-NAZI TERRORISM

Four men were killed and one man badly maimed in two obviously racist bomb attacks in Austria in early February. Following a series of right-wing extremist letter-bomb attacks in late 1993, this new culmination of Nazi violence in Austria was highlighted by the world media. Little attention has, however, to date been paid to how the Austrian Interior Ministry and Police are dealing with what appears to be a well-organised campaign of terror against ethnic minorities and persons known as "foreigner friends". Instead of hunting the perpetrators, the Interior Ministry is often criminalising the victims.

In the early morning of 5 February, four Austrian Roma men were found dead, killed by a violent explosion, on an access road to their neighbourhood in the small town of Oberwart (Burgenland). A metal placard bearing the inscription "Roma back to India" was found near the bodies.

Only hours after the discovery, a special criminal investigation unit established that the explosion was caused by a bomb concealed inside a metal tube. Its detonator had been skilfully connected to the placard, so that anyone moving the placard would set off the bomb. Inhabitants of the Roma neighbourhood said that their community had received several anonymous threats by phone in recent weeks. Late at night on 4 February, suspect car noises were heard in the neighbourhood and the four men left their homes in order to check the access road.

In spite of all this evidence pointing at a racist crime, for 24 hours, both the police and the spokes men of the Interior Ministry systematically suggested that the four Roma might have caused their death themselves:

- Police began their investigation by searching the houses of the victims. Only a week after the attack, did the police finally proceed with house searches of well-known Nazi activists in the Burgenland region.
- A first hypothesis spread to the media by the police and the Interior Ministry was that the four men might have killed each other with a shot-gun, or - alternatively - might have killed themselves by accident while trying to blow up the placard.

Only on 6 February did the Interior Minister finally publicly confirm what the special investigating unit had established 24 hours before (!) - that the four Roma were the victims of a bomb attack.

The same day, another bomb exploded in Stinatz/Stinjaki (Burgenland). The Austrian-Croatian population is strong in this bilingual town. A municipal refuse worker was badly maimed in the blast. The bomb was hidden in a spray-can and lay on the ground near a refuse container next to a children's playground.

Interior Minister Franz Löschnak first cynically warned the population against refuse containers and "sprays left lying around". The same day a letter of confession was found at a bus stop in Burgenland calling for the return of the "Stoisits, Grandits, Sifkovits and Janisch" - i.e Austrian Croats, "to Dalmatia".

The threat appears to be directly aimed against Terezija Stoitsits, MP and spokeswoman on minority issues of the Austrian Green Party.

Defaming the victims

The police and the Interior Minister's early statements had a disastrous effect on public opinion, in particular for the Roma. The tabloid press, and even more serious media quickly focused on alleged Roma criminality and internal clan violence. While formally condemning the attacks, officials of Jörg Haider's anti-foreigner party FPÖ talked about "leftist activists' co-responsibility" for having attempted to paint Haider's party as an extreme right-wing movement. By doing so, they had actually encouraged and provoked right-wing extremists, the FPÖ contended.

During the parliament's debate on the attack in Oberwart, FPÖ-leader Haider distinguished himself by calling the Nazi concentration camps for "penitentiary camps".

Only after the bomb attack in Stinatz did Interior Minister Löschnak get round to talking about a bomb attack, "probably with an ethnic background".

Inaction at the Interior Ministry

Many observers in Austria see some method behind the Interior Minister's reluctance to acknowledge the existence of organised Nazi terrorism and his initial inclination to blame the victims.

A first series of letter bombings took place in December 1993. The letters were sent to a series of persons known for their "pro-foreigner" stands. Nonetheless, for days, the Viennese tabloid, *Die Kronenzeitung*, referring to "well-informed sources" within the police, suggested that Turkish immigrants might be involved in the bombings.

In early summer 1994, a policeman trying to defuse a bomb found in front of a bilingual school teaching mostly children of the Slovenian minority in Klagenfurt (the capital of the *land* of Carinthia), had both his hands torn off. The Interior Minister obstinately denied any political background to the incident. Instead, he suggested a possible involvement of the local prostitution business in the crime. For several weeks, the authorities simply kept silent about the existence of a letter of

confession addressed to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Slovenia. The letter contained a "hit list" with the names of a number of Austrian Slovenes. The persons concerned were neither warned nor offered protection by the police. The Interior Ministry later explained this strange omission by claiming it was anxious to avoid causing panic or disturbing the criminal investigation.

House searches against neo-Nazis announced in advance

It took a week for house searches to be carried out against known right-wing extremist circles, and was only done only after the Interior Minister made a personal announcement of the fact on television . . .

Only months later, in a second series of letter bombs in autumn 1994, among others, a Klagenfurt publisher of Slovenian origin, Lojze Wieser, received a letter bomb (which failed to detonate) and several death threats. The Interior Ministry put about the notion that the publisher had staged the threats himself as a publicity stunt. For days, the Interior Ministry left the public and the recipients of the letters guessing whether the letters actually contained bombs or dummies. Just as with the first letter bomb series in 1993, rumours circulated in the press about a possible foreign background - Serbian this time - to the offences.

The German connection

This is all the more notable given the Austrian security authorities' slowness and reluctance to follow an obvious line of enquiry pointing towards a conspiracy between Austrian and German Nazi groups. In the meantime, the main suspect for the December 1993 bombings is an Austrian Nazi, Peter Binder.

In early December 1994, a member of a German neo-Nazi rock band, Bendix Wendt, was stopped by police in Berlin for a traffic offence. It transpired that Wendt had been shuttling intensively between Berlin and Vienna and there is evidence for Wendt's involvement in a arms trafficking deal with Binder. The Austrian police had already become interested in Wendt within days of the December 1993 letter bombs series, but for a whole year, the German BKA (Federal Office of Criminal Investigation) refrained from issuing an international arrest warrant, and to date, the BKA has not opened its own investigation against Wendt or against several other German neo-Nazis with contacts in Austria.

Observation rather than action?

The priority of both German and Austrian security authorities seems to lie with "observing", rather than uncovering, the Nazi terrorist network. In October 1994, Austria's highest-ranking security official, Dr. Michael Sika, declared with remarkable frankness: "The letter bombs series might never be cleared up. But this is actually not of such importance. What really counts, is to look behind the scenes".

Tacit consensus

From the very beginning, the Austrian authorities, in particular the Interior Minister, have tried to play down the significance of the terrorist attack. The criminal investigations were marked by professional blunders and pernicious attempt to spread rumours. Yet, for a long time, government critics kept an astonishingly low profile. On one hand, there was some sort of a tacit consensus, that by talking about right-wing extremism one might fuel it; on the other, there were strong public calls for all democrats, i.e. the government and the public to "close ranks".

Fight against Nazi crime: More powers for the police?

In recent weeks however, open criticism has begun to focus on the person of the Interior Minister and the country's security bodies. The Interior Ministry was forced to publicly admit connections between members of the police forces and extremist right-wing circles. Interior Minister Löschnak reacted by demanding extended powers for the police to search houses, carry out phone-tapping operations, and infiltrate undercover agents without authorisation by a court, all this for the sake of increased public security. At the same time, his Ministry is pursuing its restrictive and discriminatory policy goals in the fields of asylum and foreigner law, viewed by many observers as a form of tacit encouragement of racist violence.

Sources: Documentation of the **Network for Intercultural Development**, 9.2.95, University of Klagenfurt (MIR, Institut für Schulpädagogik, Universitätsstrasse 65-67, A-9020 Klagenfurt, Tel: +43/463 27000558; Fax: +43/463 2700562; **Junge Welt**, 23.12.94.

REFORM PROPOSALS FOR RESIDENCE LAW DISGUISE FURTHER TIGHTENING OF FOREIGNER POLICY

Unable to silence the critics of the Austrian Law on Residence, in December the Interior Ministry finally came up with some reform proposals to take the heat out of the affair. Yet the proposed reforms (which

are to be discussed in parliament in February) will bring only minor positive changes and leave the inhuman character of the law fully intact. Quotas for foreign workers, students and so on will stay as well. Together with a prior decision in November to lower the maximum percentage of foreign workers from nine to eight per cent (which will force about 30,000 people out of the job market), foreigners from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) have even harder times ahead.

On the positive side, the changes will stop the absurdity of counting Austrian-born babies of non-EEA-foreigners as new immigrants and make family reunification for Austrian citizens with non-EEA-relatives a bit easier. Both groups will be taken out of the general quota for immigration, which in a compensatory move has been set for 1995 at only 17,000 compared with 26,300 for 1994. (For so-called "seasonal workers", there will be an extra quota of 4,000 after 7,000 for 1994).

Further, the proposals will do away with the existing time limits and allow applications for a renewal of a residence permit until the last day of its validity.

However, as before, failing to apply in time will transform the forgetful applicant in a new immigrant, subject to the tight quota, and force her/him to leave the country and apply from abroad. Since the quota will be filled already early in the year (most of it by relatives of resident foreigners on a "waiting list") and the processing of an application can take several months, most victims of these regulations are in danger of losing their right of residence. Some built-in mechanisms to deport or criminalise foreigners will stay untouched as well, e.g. the possibility of denying or withdrawing a residence permit if the housing conditions or the income situation of a foreign worker/family are considered as being below local standards.

These regulations have to be seen in the context of a further tightening of the job-market for foreign workers, imposed already last November. The official aim of bringing down the percentage of foreign workers from 9 to 8 per cent will endanger thousands of well-integrated families of migrants as well. Although officials in the Ministries of Interior and Social Affairs try to play down this eventuality, it seems very likely that, for example, migrant youths leaving school (about 2,500 this year), female partners of foreign workers and Bosnian refugees with residence permits will have no chance of getting a work permit.

Successful protests seem to reflect weak government position

This move has met political resistance in the federal chamber and among some regional chambers of commerce, youth workers, Catholic priests and refugee organisations. The protests seem to have some impact: the Ministry of Social Affairs wants parliament to give it the power to decree regional and other exemptions of the 8 per cent quota targeted to special groups. A corresponding bill is announced for February.

The Ministry of Social Affairs is not alone in having to back down. After a kind of a "political veto" by the Austrian Highest Administrative Court, the Interior Ministry recently had to abandon its plans to abolish the right of appeal against decisions of residence authorities, a part of the reform proposals for the Residence Law. Every appeal would have gone directly to the Highest Court, a prospect apparently not appreciated by the judges.

The official zig-zagging seems to reflect the weak position of the ruling coalition of the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the conservative People's Party (ÖVP), which is in danger of falling apart long before the next elections due in 1998. One problem is in-fighting of factions in both parties over the proposed budget cuts to lower the growing public deficit. Since the budget cuts will lower the income of the less well off disproportionately, the Social Democrats face strong resistance from union members. Inside the People's Party, there is a faction which apparently would prefer to form a small coalition with Jörg Haider's right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ). Since Haider's position on foreigners is well known all over Europe, this outcome would be a worst-case scenario not only for Austria.

Robert Poth (Vienna)

UNITED KINGDOM

ELECTRO-SHOCK WEAPONS: THE "TORTURE TRAIL"

The use of electro-shock weapons in torture, rape and a catalogue of other abuses has been widely reported. Amnesty International and the British Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture regard the shock baton as the torturers' universal tool. Nevertheless, British companies are illegally producing and selling electronic shields and batons to countries notorious for their human rights records, such as Turkey and China, a TV programme broadcast on the *Dispatches* series of Channel 4 (11 January 1995) reveals.

According to a survey by the British Forensic Science Service commissioned by the Home Office (British Interior Ministry), the effects of modern pulsed variants of electro-shock weapons on the human body are more severe by nearly two orders of magnitude than the old fashioned cattle shock prods. They cause temporary incapacitation of the whole body for at least five minutes. However, physical evidence of their use is difficult to detect.

A year ago, the British Trade Minister unequivocally agreed that "any export of equipment which can be used for torture is quite unacceptable . . . We have to ensure that this trade is stopped and whenever it comes to our notice, we do of course insist that it is stopped". British legislation imposes sharp restrictions both on production, possession and sales of electronic weapons. Export without a licence is prohibited.

Secret 'Covert Operation' exhibition

Set against this background, the ease with which an undercover team investigating for *Dispatches* managed not only to enter the heart of British defence industry and to obtain access to a secret network of electro-shock weapons manufacturers and suppliers, but also to come away with over £4 million of orders, is extraordinary indeed.

The orders reported in the programme (10,000 electro-shock shields and 5000 shock batons from British Aerospace, and 15,000 electro-shock units from ICL Technical Plastics), are prodigious quantities to let go - particularly to the Lebanon.

But perhaps the insight the programme gave into the procurement and proliferation of the electro-control technology, is even more astonishing. Philip Morris, the Sales manager for Royal Ordnance, agreed to use the company's world-wide procurement network to bring the electro-shock deal together, irrespective of the equipment's country of origin or to its eventual destination.

British Aerospace, Royal Ordnance's parent company, invited their clients to meet up at the secret Covert Operation and Procurement Exhibition (COPEX), held at Sandtown Race Track, 1-3 November 1994. A wide range of internal security equipment was on display, the entire complex being guarded by special forces. Foreign invitees included delegations from China, Algeria, Bosnia, Columbia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka and Turkey.

8000 German shock batons to Saudi Arabia

The *Dispatches* team followed through the rendezvous with a meeting at Royal Ordnance's own offices in Chorley (Lancashire). The team was shown a 40,000 volt shock baton made in Ireland, a riot shield made by Nova Technologies (USA) which could immobilise 250 people without a battery charge. In presence of the team, Sales Manager Morris confirmed that Royal Ordnance had sold 8000 German shock batons to Saudi Arabia. The *Dispatches* programme concluded that given the £500,000 cost of the deal was paid for in oil, British Aerospace would have had to invoice the Ministry of Defence for payment and thus the British government must have known what was going on.

ICL Technical Plastics: Hong Kong connection

The *Dispatches* team also interviewed Frank Stott, the boss of ICL Technical Plastics in Glasgow and a founding member of the Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers. Stott said the Scottish Office had granted him permission to manufacture electro-shock devices, but the Glasgow Police had asked him to keep very quiet about his involvement in the trade. On the programme, he claimed that he used to sell shock batons to the Apartheid regime in South Africa; to Abu Dhabi for the Gulf States. A year after the Tiananmen Square massacre, he sold electro-shock weapons to China, via Hong Kong, with the Government's blessing and the support of the British Department of Trade and Industry [DTI: The body charged with overseeing the control of the export of weapons and other controlled goods and services].

Mr. Stott claimed that the Chinese wanted the weapons to copy. Such vertical proliferation is a fearful consequence since Chinese workshops are already producing 80,000 shock weapons a year and their use, according to Amnesty, has become endemic in this country.

Electric shields no weapon, Home Office says

In the *Dispatches* programme, the Home Office (British Interior Ministry) denied that any police force in the UK possessed or planned to possess shock-weapons. Yet, on 19 January, the same Home Office admitted that electronic shields had been bought by senior officers in several of Great Britain's police forces. The Home Office denied that this amounted to any inconsistency with its earlier statements in the programme, as the electronic shield was "not a weapon - it is a defensive instrument". [This is an interesting interpretation. In Germany, the carrying of helmets by demonstrators is prohibited on the grounds that helmets are "passive weapons"].

The British government has since confirmed that no authority had been granted neither to ICL nor to British Aerospace to manufacture, possess or sell electro-shock weapons. According to a Government spokesman, "no company has been granted authority specifically to possess electric shock weapons in the last two years". Therefore, given the evidence presented in the *Dispatches* programme, British Aerospace salesman Philip Morris and ICL's Frank Stott will face five years in jail, if the government wishes to be seen as taking the control of trade seriously.

European Parliament: governments breach their own export bans

In Britain, the Labour opposition has called for a full investigation in the "electronic control" trade.

On 19 January, the European Parliament also backed Amnesty's call for an investigation and called upon the Commission to "bring forward new proposals to incorporate these technologies within the scope of arms export controls and ensure greater transparency in the export of all military, security and police technologies to prevent the hypocrisy of governments who themselves breach their own export bans".

Indeed there is urgent need for action - not only in the UK. European companies known to have been involved in the manufacture or supply of electro-shock weapons include Browning (Belgium); Equipol, France-Selection, Neral & Cie SARL (France); Bonowi, ERO, Micro and Security International; Romer, Sicherheitstechnik Schmid, and Solid Company (Germany).

Robin Ballantyne

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GERMANY

PROJECT FOR AN "ASYLUM-CARD" RAISES WIDESPREAD CONCERN

The project of the Conference of the Interior Ministers of the German *Länder* and the Federal Republic, to introduce a compulsory electronic "smart card" for asylum seekers (see CL No.30, p.8) is causing a public row. The public revelation of the confidential project by the Data Protection Commissioner of Lower Saxony has deeply annoyed the Interior Ministers. Data Protection Commissioners, computer experts and senior politicians warn that, if introduced, the "Asylum-Card" will transform asylum seekers into mere objects of state administration and will pave the way towards the making of the "transparent citizen.

According to the draft project drawn up by a joint Federal and *Länder* working group of Interior Ministry officials "for the harmonisation of administrative proceedings in asylum procedures", asylum seekers shall be required to carry the smart card at all times. The micro-chip integrated in the card shall provide for the storing and processing of the personal data, a photograph, a digitalized finger-print, as well as comprehensive information on the current state of the asylum procedure, the receipt of food and other public benefits, the holder's registered address and the work permit. The draft report on the project makes it clear that this list could be gradually extended. The idea of the working group is to set out the ground rules for asylum applications based on three principles:

1. No asylum application without electronic data registration.
2. No electronic data registration - no Asylum Card.
3. No Asylum Card - no benefits.

According to the working group the introduction of the card would provide for the "optimisation of the [asylum] procedure through the minimisation of administrative costs by the means of permanent demand-oriented accessibility of information". The report even expressly considers the possibility of the Asylum Card being extended to the whole of Europe.

Asylum Card: a door-opener towards unlimited control?

In the view of Dr. Gerhard Dronsch, Data Protection Commissioner of Lower Saxony, "the introduction of such a compulsory smart card containing data about all spheres of life, which can be used for many purposes, would violate the German Constitution". For all users with access to the information on the card the bearers would become "transparent people". Refugees would be made "pure objects, consisting purely of computerised information patterns, as defined by the administration. Dr. Dronsch expresses alarm about the fact that the working group did not pay any real attention to data protection. A press release from the Data Commissioner concluded with a serious warning: "What is planned here for asylum seekers, can, in principle, be extended for everyone. In this respect, the Asylum Card would open the door for similar steps to be taken for minority groups, e.g. social security claimants, or the unemployed".

A "perfectly honourable project"?

Dr. Dronsch's severe warnings appear to have impressed some senior politicians. Several *Länder*-governments

now question the constitutionality of an Asylum Card; but most Christian Democrat *Länder* governments welcome the project. In the words of the spokesman of the Bavarian Ministry of Social Affairs, the "Asylum Card" is a "perfectly honourable project" that will "not be abused but rather prevent abuse".

The Dutch model

The Interior Ministers' working group has also justified the introduction of the card with the need to keep in pace with similar projects in other EU member states.

As a matter of fact, a more modest form of the Asylum Card was introduced in 1993 and asylum seekers are submitted to routine checks up to three or four times a day. Refusal to carry the card can entail deportation. When the card was introduced in Holland, the Dutch Minister of Justice enthusiastically predicted that it would drastically reduce the number of asylum seekers. "Moreover, we will immediately learn when someone goes underground". In such cases, the absconder's data are communicated to the authorities abroad.

Sources: **Junge Welt**, Berlin, 5.1.95, article by Miriam Lang; Press release of the Data Commissioner of Lower Saxony, Hannover, 3.1.95; Press-dispatches from DPA and ADN, 3/4.1.95; our sources.

ASYLUM TOPICS

Deportation of Kurds once again postponed

The Federal Interior Ministry has prolonged to 28 February a temporary halt on deportations of rejected Kurdish asylum seekers to Turkey. Interior Minister Kanther justified the measure by referring to the need to further examine the human rights situation in Turkey, following the prison sentences imposed on eight Kurdish MPs. Criminal offenders and those whose asylum application has been rejected and whose deportation has already been agreed with Turkey will, however, not benefit from the measure.

In spite of the temporary halt, there is no doubt that the German government is still eager to go ahead with the deportation of Turkish Kurds. On 15 January, German-Turkish negotiations on an agreement dealing with returns began. According to the Turkish daily, *Hürriyet*, the agreement provides for the installation of a special "returnee office" at Istanbul's Atatürk airport. There, all returnees from Germany shall be interrogated by Turkish police and a German official, in presence of a lawyer and a medical doctor. These proceedings are intended to "calm the German public", *Hürriyet* says.

Gambia no longer rated as a safe country

The governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP (Liberals) intends to introduce legislation establishing that Gambia is not a safe country of origin and that refugees from Gambia must be granted full access to asylum procedures.

In the new German asylum law introduced in 1993, Gambia was listed as a safe country of origin. After last year's military coup in that country, however, the Federal Interior Minister issued an order revoking this classification.

Increased control by Border Protection

The German border protection force, *Bundesgrenzschutz* (BGS), has stepped up controls at the French-German border between Alsacia and Baden-Württemberg following an increase of illegal border crossings. The BGS reported that more than 200 Kosovo-Albanians were stopped and returned to France within three weeks in early January.

Agreement on return of 40,000 Vietnamese

Germany has reached agreement with Vietnam on the return of some 40,000 Vietnamese living in Germany without a legal status. In exchange, Germany offers Hanoi 100 million DM respectively in aid in 1995 and 1996. The Bonn government has also announced its intention to intensify its economic and political cooperation with Hanoi.

Negotiations on the agreement are expected to begin in March. The German government plans to return 20,000 "illegal" Vietnamese within the next four years.

Most of the Vietnamese living in Germany without a permit are former contract workers recruited by the former Honecker government in East Germany (see CL No.21, p.8).

Restriction to "safe third country" practice

The Higher Administrative Court of Rheinland-Pfalz has restricted the use of the so-called "third country clause" in the German asylum law. Under the provision, asylum seekers entering Germany via a "safe third country" are automatically denied an examination of their asylum application. Under the law, all neighbouring states of

Germany are rated as "safe countries".

The decision of the Court establishes the obligation for German authorities to prove from which "safe third country" the person concerned has entered German territory. The mere assumption that the itinerary of the concerned must have led through a safe country, does not suffice, the Court held.

Sources: Die Welt, 6.1.95, 12.1.95; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13.1.95; Junge Welt, 16.1.95; Frankfurter Rundschau, 18.1.95,

GERMAN-UKRAINIAN AGREEMENT ON FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME

On 6 February, German Interior Minister Kanther and his Ukrainian counterpart, Vladimir Radchenko, signed a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the fight against "organised crime".

The two states bind themselves to cooperate against drug-related crime, money laundering, car theft, trafficking in arms and nuclear materials, as well as money counterfeiting, smuggling of illegal immigrants and terrorism.

The agreement provides for an exchange of information, research findings and experts. A "Mixed Commission" will meet periodically to ensure the implementation of the agreement.

An interesting aspect of the agreement is that terrorism is subordinated to "organised crime". According to prevailing German concepts of security, terrorism is considered an independent phenomenon of threat against internal security, alongside the other main threats, "organised crime" and illegal immigration.

According to the Parliamentary Secretary of State of the Federal Interior Ministry, preventing "rapidly escalating illegal immigration that takes place at the instigation and with the support of smuggler groups operating over the frontiers", has become a task of particular importance.

Germany is trying to conclude similar agreements on "organised crime" with all eastern European states and the CIS countries, within a scheme of three geographical circles: agreements have already been signed with the states belonging to the "first circle", Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. Following Estonia, Ukraine is the second country belonging to the "second circle" to sign an agreement. The remaining "second circle" countries are Byelorussia, Russia, Latvia and Lithuania. The "third circle" is made up of the Central Asian CIS republics.

Source: Junge Welt, 7.2.95.

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS MAIN SECURITY THREAT

The *Bundesverfassungsschutz* (BVS), Germany's internal federal intelligence service has defined its new "main enemy". A press release distributed by the agency on 11 January says: "The Islamic terrorists are now more dangerous for Germany than the Red Army Faction [RAF: former Baader-Meinhoff Group]". According to the service, the "particularly brutal Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA)" has set its sights on Germany.

In the opinion of BVS president Werthebach, the issue is about "the great confrontation between Christian-occidental culture and Islam".

Source: Junge Welt, 12.1.95.

EUROPE

DROP IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

Significant decreases of the number of asylum seekers are reported in most western European states. At the same time, illegal immigration is believed to be on the increase in several countries.

Following drastic restrictions introduced in 1993 and early 1994, the number of asylum seekers decreased significantly in almost all EU member states during 1994. Only Great Britain and the Netherlands reported increases of asylum applications. In the Netherlands, the number of applications was 55,000 in 1994, against 36,000 in 1993. Finland and Portugal received the smallest number of asylum seekers, with respectively 836 and 520 applications. Once again, Germany received most asylum seekers, but the number of applications dropped by 200,000 (60 per cent) between 1993 and 1994. Only 7.3 per cent of all applicants were granted asylum.

Switzerland

In Switzerland, asylum applications declined by 30 per cent to 16,134 in 1994. The recognition quota was 11.7 per cent. A spokesman for the Federal Office for Refugees said that the acceleration of procedures had rendered Switzerland "less attractive" for asylum seekers. Moreover the blocked Balkan route was acting as a brake on refugee fluxes from India, Pakistan and Turkey.

Increased illegal immigration?

The significant drop in asylum applications appears to coincide with an increasing number of illegal entries in most western European states.

Since January, the Swiss Border Protection Corps has been equipped with electronic video devices with an aim to prevent illegal entry. The cameras are installed in "sensitive" border areas. The video recordings are erased after 24 hours, but can be retained longer for evidential purposes.

France is making wide use of random checks to detect illegal residents and Germany is continually increasing surveillance at its eastern borders, where 55,000 attempts of illegal entry were registered in 1993.

Exporting problems to eastern Europe

The western European clamp-down on asylum seekers is causing serious problems mainly for eastern European countries. According to UNHCR estimates, there are some 500,000 foreign clandestine workers in Poland. The UNHCR now warns against a deterioration of the situation in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary, since these countries have announced the introduction of restrictive entry regulations.

In Poland, foreigners refusing to comply with a deportation order are now detained pending deportation under a law adopted by parliament on 5 January. Deportees can be detained for up to 90 days.

The lack of functioning asylum legislation in many eastern European countries is contributing to the problem. Thus, for example, in Estonia, asylum seekers on their way to Sweden and other western European countries are sentenced to imprisonment for "illegal entry" (see CL No.27, p.3) and Latvia is locking up refugees returned by Estonia in old army barracks.

Sources: Frankfurter Rundschau, 19.1.95; Neues Deutschland, 19.1.95; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 4.1.95, 3.2.95; Die Welt, 6.1.95; Dagens Nyheter, 25.1.95.

COMPROMISE ON EUROPOL CONVENTION WITHIN REACH?

At the European Council of Essen on 9-10 December, no agreement was reached on a Europol Convention. Instead, the Council decided to broaden the already operational Europol Drug Unit's (EDU) mandate, which currently covers trafficking in stolen cars, nuclear materials, and human beings, to illegal immigration and to money laundering linked to these activities.

At an informal meeting in Paris on 26 January, the Interior Ministers appeared to have come closer to a compromise on the Convention. Agreement was reached to include terrorism in Europol's remit. The French Presidency now hopes for a final agreement at the European Council in Cannes on 26-27 June.

The broadening of the EDU's scope of activities decided by the Essen Council, was formalised by the Interior Ministers at their Paris meeting. Thus, the EDU will continue to expand on the mere basis of a provisional administrative-technical, inter-ministerial agreement, i.e. without a legal basis and outside democratic control.

This is all the more remarkable given the fact, proudly reported by the EDU's 'Coordinator' and Europol Director *in spe*, Jürgen Storbeck, that the EDU answered to more than 350 particular inquiries from police forces of the member states. Compared with traditional forms of police cooperation via time-consuming hierarchical channels, national criminal investigation authorities now send their inquiry directly to their liaison officer at the EDU in The Hague, who will forward it to his colleagues from the other EU-countries. Some 27 national liaison officers are now working at the EDU. The German representation is largest with six liaison officers, while Portugal is represented by only one officer who works in The Hague only two or three days a week.

Europol Convention: Compromise on sensitive data

The French Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, proposed a compromise over the confidentiality of information collected and processed by Europol. It is believed that, under the terms of the compromise, sensitive data provided by a member state would not be available to all police forces of the member states, as earlier demanded by France. Only Europol analysts and representatives of the member states of origin (the liaison officers at Europol's headquarters in The Hague) could access it. Other member states could ask for access to the data, but would have to submit and justify a written request. The final decision would be taken by Europol's Board of directors.

Belgium, Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal have agreed to the French proposal, while Germany and the Netherlands are willing to consider it. Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, the UK and Sweden are said to be "favourably inclined" towards the compromise.

Europol to deal with terrorism

Agreement was reached to extend Europol's range of activity to terrorism, as advocated by Spain, Greece and, more recently, Denmark. The UK and Germany had earlier opposed the inclusion of terrorism, mainly because they wished to keep the existing secretive EU network of intelligence and internal security agencies outside the

purview of the Council.

The widening of Europol's scope would automatically take effect two years after the signing of the Convention.

Charles Pasqua said after the Paris meeting that a general agreement on the Europol Convention was now within reach and suggested that it could be made more specific at a meeting of the Interior Ministers on 9 March.

Sources: European Report, No. 2011, 28.1.95; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26.11.94; Statewatch Vol. 4, No. 6, Nov-Dec 94.

OPINION

THE ETHICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROLS

That the rights of asylum seekers in Europe need to be defended more vigorously than at present would probably be accepted by almost all development NGOs, and by a sizeable minority of the general public. But an even more fundamental issue is whether development NGOs should question the ethics of global immigration controls in general, and not just the barriers to the movement of those fleeing from persecution. Could it not be argued that immigration restrictions constitute a form of "global apartheid", ensuring that poorer sections of world society are prevented, by legal and physical force, from sharing in total world riches? The following article by Andy Storey seeks to develop this theme, by arguing that immigration controls are based on dubious ethical and practical foundations, and that NGOs should be more willing than hitherto to challenge their validity. The author is research adviser with the Irish NGO Trocaire, though the views in this article are expressed in a personal capacity.

In her most recent book on the debt crisis - *The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All*¹ - Susan George discusses its cost for the "First World" through the impact of "boomerangs" like the lost market opportunities and global environment destruction. One chapter argues that the "First World" will, to a certain extent, also pay a price for continued debt and underdevelopment in the "Third World" in the form of influxes of poor, would-be immigrants seeking to escape poverty in their own countries.

While George is certainly correct in her identification of this "boomerang" effect, my central problem with her approach to the immigration issue relates to the very legitimacy of immigration control. Her views are encapsulated in her statement that:

The right-wing, knee-jerk "we shall fight them on the beaches" riposte is as inappropriate as the "liberal" or "progressive" notion that the rich countries can somehow maintain open borders².

The notion that the rich countries cannot (and should not) allow free entry to anyone and everyone would probably be accepted by many commentators. Most lobbying on the issue of immigration by human rights groups focuses on the need to afford protection to "genuine" asylum-seekers, who should be let in, as opposed to "economic migrants", who simply want a better life and who, according to many, should be excluded.

I am not suggesting that lobbying for the rights of asylum seekers is not a necessary and practical activity. My point is that it can legitimately be argued that everyone in the South has a right to a better life, and the North has no right to deny access to it, wherever it may be found.

This position, of course, rests upon a strong (and openly idealist) assumption. Others may disagree with it, and thus reject the substance of my argument. But such disagreement would at least bring differences in underlying value judgements to the fore. At present, most objections to freedom of movement are assumed to be so self-evidently valid that the values on which they rest are never seriously examined. I will now look at four of the most common such objections.

1. The "decent living" argument

When former French premier Michel Rocard said: "We can't take in the whole of the world's misery", he was, according to Susan George, "speaking the literal truth"³. Susan George argues that further immigration would make it difficult to "ensure a decent living . . . for those immigrants who are already in the North". But how does one define a "decent living"? Average GNP *per capita* is US\$80 in Mozambique, compared with US\$ 17,820 in

France (though immigrants, of course, usually earn much less). If people in Mozambique are expected to live (or die) on such a small sum, then the argument that France could not ensure a "decent living" (by the standards of the poorest countries of the world) for a greatly increased population starts to look a little threadbare.

One long-term consequence of totally free population movement would be to ensure greater equality of incomes around the world: high-income locations would attract inflows, pushing down incomes; and low-income locations would suffer out-flows, raising average incomes for those left behind. If total world income were evenly distributed, each person would receive somewhere in the region of US\$4,000, which would represent a major drop in French living standards, but would be sufficient to ensure that no-one in the world died of starvation. In other words, it would mean the fulfilment for all of the minimal conditions for a "decent living". Undermining the present income levels of all those living in the North (migrants and indigenous) can therefore be seen as being in the interests of broader global justice.

It might be argued that unrestrained inflows of immigrants would not equalise incomes within countries: the immigrants would remain at the bottom end of the Northern labour market, in worsening conditions of unemployment and poverty. There are two responses to this: first, unemployment and poverty in the North might still be preferable to their equivalents in the South; second, the correct response to relative poverty in the North is surely to press for greater equality and justice *within* Northern societies, not to help to sustain injustice at a global level by keeping the numbers of the poor in the North down to "manageable" proportions. The deplorable situation that many immigrants are living on the margins of society calls for increased protection and demarginalisation, not barriers to free movement.

The vision of a world with an equal distribution of income between and within countries is, of course, utopian; but it highlights the fact that those who argue that immigration undermines the possibility of a "decent living" for all do so from a standpoint of relative affluence. One does not have to believe that greater global equality is a good thing in itself. The point is simply that, if such equality arises as a side-effect of the exercise of freedom of movement, then it cannot be condemned simply because it depresses the incomes of a certain group of relatively well-off people. From a global perspective, there is no convincing argument against freedom of movement on these grounds.

Practical evidence also rebuts the suggestion that immigration would make it impossible to provide a "decent living" for all in the recipient countries. By far the heaviest relative concentrations of immigrants and refugees are to be found in some of the poorest countries of the world. For example, in 1987, Malawi was hosting at least 200,000 Mozambican refugees, equivalent to 2.4 per cent of its population. Pakistan played host to 3 million Afghan refugees, equivalent to 2.7 per cent of its population. If countries which are much poorer than those of the North can carry such "burdens", then the argument that rich countries cannot offer at least equivalent hospitality is shown to be patently spurious.

2. The "relative freedom from racism" argument

Susan George argues that further immigration to France and elsewhere would make it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure "relative freedom from racism" for those immigrants already in the North, thus implicitly accepting the case for differential immigration control between blacks and whites.

Racism against immigrants is, of course, a problem which needs to be tackled - but it is not a problem which legitimises immigration barriers, any more than discrimination against gay and lesbian people legitimises policies which encourage (or force) people not to declare their sexuality. To accept immigration controls is to accept defeat in the struggle against racism. Just as poor living and working conditions for immigrants constitute arguments for the elimination of the conditions, rather than the people, so racist attacks constitute arguments for the elimination of racism, rather than its victims.

Implicit in Susan George's argument is the notion that uncontrolled (non-white) immigration would generate uncontrollable racist reactions, leading to situations of extreme crisis. She cites a study - from the early 1980s which predicts that Los Angeles could well "become 75 per cent Hispanic in the year 2000 with unemployment rates quite possibly as high as 12 to 15 per cent. Such hardships would then make the Hispanics the most easily targeted scapegoats for the economic grievances of the 'indigenous workers'"⁴. This scenario is surely an argument in favour of immigration: the more "Hispanics" there are, the less chance there is that they can easily be persecuted. When a grouping constitutes 75 per cent of the population, it is in a far stronger position to resist racism than if it constitutes a vulnerable minority. However, immigration controls institutionalise the present vulnerable positions of minorities.

3. Damaging the economies of the poor countries

The out-flow of people from the poor countries which the lifting of immigration restrictions might encourage would, it is argued, lower the development potential of those countries, since their most valuable resource, the most energetic and intelligent sections of the population, would apply their abilities elsewhere.

There is some truth in this argument, but it hardly constitutes a justification for the maintenance of immigration controls on the part of the North. If such controls were to be rationalised on this basis, it would amount to the North saying, "It would be better for you if you stayed where you are. We are enforcing these controls for your own good". Such a patronising attitude would not be accepted as legitimate by development NGOs in other areas of North/South relations, including trade issues.

Similarly, people in developing countries may choose not to migrate, or their governments may seek to persuade them not to do so; that is their right. Northern

governments have no right to make choices for them.

While the right of Northern governments to restrict Southern emigrant flows can be rejected, Southern societies do undoubtedly suffer through out-flows of labour, especially of skilled labour. A US study estimates that in 1971-72, the South as a whole lost an "investment" of US\$20,000 for each skilled emigrant, amounting to a total loss of US\$646 million. Only some of these losses are recouped through remittances.

The current immigration policies of Northern countries serve to encourage this "brain drain", by selectively allowing the entry to some highly skilled and qualified people from the South:

The industrial countries, in what is effectively a "buyers market" for migrants, have been setting higher and higher levels of qualification - giving preference to highly skilled workers, or to those who bring capital with them, or letting in only political refugees...

The industrial countries are now in a position to ask not just for labour but also for money. Canada and the United States, for example, have been giving preference to investors and are said to have attracted millions of dollars this way.⁵

There is a socio-economic cost associated with emigration from Southern countries. And, of course, there is more to emigration than a narrow calculation of economic benefits and losses; the social and psychological impacts should be accorded equal importance. These are not invariably negative, but it is true that emigration imposes huge costs on those who move and those who are left behind.

Would it make sense for Southern societies to suffer increased out-migration when the socio-economic losses associated with present emigration levels are so significant? Are the potential losses sufficiently severe to justify, in the interests of the overall good, limitations on individuals' rights to move? While the implementation of such restrictions on the part of Northern governments might be cynical and indefensible in principle, could the restrictions be exempted from criticism by development NGOs on the grounds that their ultimate (unintended) impact was to limit damage to Southern economies and societies?

I think the answer is "no". For a start, emigration confers economic benefits, as well as losses, on sending societies. Remittances from emigrant workers in Northern and Gulf countries are an important source of income for many sending countries and stimulate knock-on economic activity. At present, immigration restrictions enormously limit the potential economic benefits of remittances.

Emigration on a large scale may make particular sense in situations of extreme poverty, unemployment and population growth - conditions which characterise much of the South:

Some 38 million extra people join the labour force [in the South] each year. Added to more than 700 million people already unemployed or underemployed [40 per cent of the labour force], this means that one billion new jobs must be created, or improved, by the end of the decade -equivalent to the total population of the North.⁶

In this context, emigration may be the only means to relieve intolerable pressures. Given previous experience in the North, out-migration may be a vital element in a particular stage of the development process, a notion which Northern governments now conveniently ignore:

Eurocentrism has quite simply ignored the fact that the demographic explosion of Europe, caused, like the analogous explosion in the Third World, by capitalist transformation, was accompanied by massive emigration to the Americas and a few other regions of the world. Without massive emigration, Europe would have had to undertake its agricultural and industrial revolutions in conditions of demographic pressure analogous to those in the Third World today. The number of people of European ancestry living outside Europe is currently twice the size of the population of the migrants' countries of origin.⁷

Development NGOs do not have to endorse a specifically capitalist transformation in the South to discern the relevant historical parallel: without some outlet for "surplus" labour, it may be impossible for regions to transform their socio-economic systems.

Of course, it would be ideal if no-one were to become "surplus" to a system, and if equitable global development could provide everyone with the opportunity of making a decent living in their home region. Pursuing such objectives is valuable, because it helps to expand people's choices and alleviate the pressures which might otherwise make emigration or destitution the only available alternatives. But calls for measures to stimulate development in the poor regions should be justified by their own merits: the alleviation of poverty and the expansion of choice. These are independent of the case for the free movement of people, which also stands in its own right.

The various economic arguments which can be

made for the free movement of people are not justifications in themselves for free movement. Their importance lies in their being counterweights to the contention that migration will necessarily damage the economies of poor societies. While there are arguments on both sides, there would seem to be no clear basis for preventing migration in order to protect the interests of world society. In other words, if one starts (as I do) from the presumption that people should have the freedom to move, then only firm evidence that the exercise of such free movement would actively damage the welfare of society as a whole can be used to justify limiting it.

An argument which mirrors the suggestion that free movement of people would damage the economies of poor countries is that free movement facilitates the perpetuation of unjust social structures. In other words, by "draining off" the unemployed and the otherwise dissatisfied, migration relieves social tensions which would otherwise have led to irresistible pressure for a radical reform of society. There may be some truth in this. It may also be true that the absence of emigration merely contributes to unemployment and poverty, in turn creating apathy and disillusion: inertia, rather than revolutionary fervour, characterises many impoverished societies. Equally, if social pressure was brought to a head by the lack of the emigration "safety-valve", it could very well be channelled into reactionary forms, such as the revival of fundamentalism or fascism. These two considerations - that the lack of emigration outlets might not generate much pressure for change, and that if such change was generated it might not be positive - strongly suggests that people's freedom to move should not be overruled on the basis of a tentative hope that this will cause progressive social change.

4. Accepting a "free market" ideology

It may be feared that to promote the free movement of people would appear to endorse the free-trade and free-markets paradigm, and thus reinforce a model of development which renders it increasingly difficult for people to determine their own development priorities.

There is certainly a logic to opposing development which elevates the free movement of the inanimate (but not the animate) to the level of sacred dogma. But an appropriate alternative need not to accept the free movement of people and things, nor the need to restrict the movement of both. At present, things (capital, commodities) are free to move, but people are not; development NGOs can plausibly argue for the opposite. In order that people can democratically design and implement their own development agendas - at local, regional, and global levels - controls on movement of goods may sometimes be necessary. If so, there is every reason to support such controls. But people should not be treated in the same manner: if people wish to move, they must be allowed to do so. Even if such movement might have negative effects on others (and this is debatable), one of the core values of a truly "alternative" development strategy to be propounded by NGOs should surely be the maximisation of human freedom.

Conclusion

This article aims to demonstrate that if one starts from a certain value judgement - in this case, a presumption that freedom of movement should be maximised on the grounds of broadening the range of human choices - then this casts serious doubts on the objections commonly raised to the idea of unlimited South-North migration.

The arguments for freeing up such migration could have been made on alternative grounds: for example, that the capitalist system has historically exploited Southern labour, attracting some of it to the North to perform menial jobs (where illegality and racism serve the useful function of limiting workers' rights, and the fight for those rights); but keeping most of it in the South, where it can be exploited by Northern transnational companies and others. If this position were to be adopted, the argument against immigration controls could be formulated in terms of resistance to imperialism and to its historical (as well as on-going) exploitation of Southern labour.

Whatever position is adopted, reasoned argument demands that the underlying values and/or analytical frameworks be made explicit, whether they are the "liberal" notion of increasing individual choice or the "socialist" conception of the injustice of class oppression. Unfortunately, the debate to date has often been based on sloppy assumptions rooted in supposed "common sense". This article has sought to challenge some of these assumptions.

The thrust of this article has been that not only political refugees but all "economic migrants" should be allowed access to the North. However, it can be convincingly argued that if human rights groups adopted such a position, governments would dismiss it and use the excuse to tighten restrictions against all-comers.

This raises questions of tactics: in a situation where the best that can be achieved is the protection of a relatively small number of people (persecutees seeking political asylum) who are in conditions of dire insecurity, then it is appropriate to concentrate on attempts to safeguard their welfare. For instance, many people are concerned with promoting greater equality between everyone in society, but this does not mean that they will not prioritise a campaign to protect the living standards of those at the lowest income levels, such as those depending on social-welfare payments.

While recognising tactical imperatives, the philosophical premise of this article could nevertheless be adopted as a part of a broader (and long-term) alternative conception of the "world order" by development NGOs and others. The implications for us are enormous: are we prepared to accept sharing "our" wealth and "our" space with those poorer than ourselves? Accepting free movement poses far more direct challenges to our standards of living than, for example, massively increased development aid. It therefore challenges in a much more profound way the depth of our commitment to an equitable distribution of global resources.

It is time that development NGOs took this chal-

lence more seriously.

Andy Storey

Notes

1. Susan George (1992), **The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All**, London: Pluto Press in association with the Transnational Institute.
2. Ibid, p. 112.
3. Ibid, p. 112.
4. Ibid, p. 115.
5. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 57.
6. Ibid, p. 54.
7. S. Amin (1988), **Eurocentrism**, London: Zed Books, p. 112.

The above text is an abridged version of **The ethics of immigration controls: issues for development NGOs**, published in **Development in Practice**, Vol. 4, No.3, October 1994 (OXFAM publications). Andy Storey's address for correspondence is: Trocaire, 169 Booterstown Avenue, Co Dublin, Ireland; Fax: +353/1 2883577.

DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS

EUROPEAN COUNCIL

Minimum guarantees for asylum applications, Note from the Presidency, Brussels, 23.7.94, 8713/94, restricted.

The proposals would not lead to community legislation. The regulations on access to the asylum procedure, the basic features of the procedure itself and the designation of the authorities responsible for examination of applications are a matter of national legislation. A number of proposals referring to "manifestly unfounded" applications restrict the very access to an examination procedure and inter alia provide for deportation of the concerned to a "safe country" pending an appeal.

Explanatory note to Parliament, by the British Home Office, 10.11.94.

Guidelines for the application of the criteria for determining refugee status in Article 1 A of the Geneva Convention, Presidency proposals, Brussels, 6675/94 (no date mentioned).

The proposals include attempts to define the term of "justified fear of persecution" under the Geneva Convention. One interesting proposal says: "The fact that an individual, prior to his departure from his country of origin, was not subject to persecution or directly threatened with in that country does not mean that he cannot in asylum proceedings claim a justified fear of persecution". There, however seems to be no unanimity about this definition.

As opposed to current practice of several member states (e.g. France) that recognises only persecution by the state as a grounds for asylum, one proposal says: "People may also be persecuted by third parties, if an asylum seeker is seriously threatened by his fellow citizens . . . and the government encourages, permits or deliberately tolerates such persecution...[The] person concerned may also be eligible for refugee status if the public authorities are unable to provide adequate protection".

The draft guidelines also establish the principle of "safe areas in unsafe countries", by denying a right to asylum if a person may be "reasonably expected to move elsewhere within the country of origin in order to avoid persecution".

Considering member states' reluctance to grant asylum to war resisters from former Yugoslavia, the following proposal deserves attention: "Deliberate refusal to perform military service or desertion will in any event be deemed acceptable and will constitute grounds for fear of persecution if it can plausibly be shown that they represent a conscious refusal to participate in military action of a kind which is condemned by the international community because of its inhumane nature or in accordance with generally applicable norms under international law. In such cases the asylum seeker's political convictions, for which he is being persecuted by the authorities are in line with what is expected of him by the international community".

Explanatory note by the British Home Office, 10.11.94.

Presidency compromise text for a Council regulation laying down a uniform format for Visas, Brussels 31.10.94, 10506/94, restricted.

The draft *inter alia* contains regulations regarding security features of the uniform Visa format.

The visa label will include an optically variable mark ("kinegram"). "Depending of the angle of vision 12 stars, "E" signs and a globe become visible in various sizes and colours"; a logo indicating the issuing member state, appearing "light when held flat and dark when turned by 90 degrees"; the word "visa" appearing "in

optically variable colouring". One box shall contain "the relevant machine-readable information to facilitate external border controls".

UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Nineth "Mazowiecki report" on the human rights situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, 31.10.94, E/CN.4/1995/54.

On the human rights situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro), and Macedonia.

Permanent Peoples' Tribunal (Basso Foundation), Judgement pronounced on 12.12.94 in Berlin, 22 p.

The Members of the Tribunal were: F. Rigaux (President, Belgium); M. Benchikh (Algeria), Vera Chirwa (Malawi), L. Fekete (UK), L. Ferrajoli (Italy), F. Langer (Israel), F. Meissner-Blau (Austria), A. Nesin (Turkey), G. Pontara (Sweden), G. Wallraff (Germany).

Available at: Fondazione Basso, Via della Dogana Vecchia 5, I-00186 Rome; Tel: +39/6 6833389.

Vad händer med offentlighetsprincipen vid ett svenskt EU-medlemskap?, by Hans-Gunnar Axberger, Svenska Journalistförbundet (Swedish Federation of Journalists), 60 p., in Swedish only.

On the implications of EU-membership on Swedish freedom of information regulations.

Available at: Svenska Journalistförbundet, Box 1116, S-111 81 Stockholm; Tel: +46/8 6137 500; Fax: +46/8 212680.

PLEIN DROIT, periodical review published by GISTI (Paris), No 26, Oct-Nov 94, 54 p., in French.

This issue deals with the dismantling of social protection structures in France, mainly in the domain of public health care and with a focus on effects on foreigners.

Available at: GISTI, 30 rue des Petites Ecuries, F-75010 Paris; Tel: +33/1 42470760.

Internationale politiesamverking - Europol (International police co-operation - Europol, ed: Prof. L. van Outrive, E. Enhús, publ: Centrum voor Politiestudies (Flamish University Brussels, Dept of Criminology), 142 p., in Dutch.

A comprehensive overview and analysis of the various legal and organisational structures of European police cooperation.

Professor van Outrive, a former MEP and the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, can be considered as one of the leading experts on European policing. Among others, the book contains contributions by Maarten de Jong, Chief Superintendent of the Dutch National Police and member of the Project Team Europol (The setting up of Europol and the problem of information exchange) and by Patrick Zanders, Major of the Belgian Gendarmerie and Director of International Relations at the Central Board of Operations.

We hopefully await an English translation.

Available at: Centrum voor Politiestudies vzw, p/a VUB - School voor Criminologie, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels.

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